Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Noussair, Charles; Wilkening, Tom

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.014

Cited by 128 publications

(128 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Gains to cooperation and benefits of defection are known to influence the frequency of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium play, as Isaac and Walker (1988) discovered for the linear public goods environment when they identified the influence of the MPCR on cooperation and freeriding. In the CPR, the free rider can extract nearly all of the gains from the others' cooperation 5 Along similar lines, Nikiforakis et al (2012) find that asymmetries in public goods returns make peer punishment less effective in a linear VCM environment, which they attribute to conflicting social norms. Xiao and Kunreuther (2013) find that punishment is less effective in a stochastic than a deterministic prisoner's dilemma, and they provide evidence that this is due to normative conflict because in the stochastic environment it is less clear whether actions or outcomes should be punished.…”

Section: Public Good Dilemmas In Nonlinear Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment

Cason

Gangadharan

2014

Exp Econ

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Many social dilemmas exhibit nonlinearities and equilibrium outcomes in the interior of the choice space. This paper reports a laboratory experiment studying whether peer punishment promotes socially efficient behavior in such environments, which have been ignored in most experimental studies of peer punishment. It compares the effectiveness of peer punishment in a linear public good game to the effectiveness of this decentralized enforcement mechanism in two nonlinear social dilemma games: a piecewise linear public good game and a common pool resource game. While peer punishment improves cooperation in these new environments, the impact of punishment is weaker and takes longer to be effective. This appears to be due to the greater complexity of the nonlinear settings, which makes socially optimal choices more difficult to identify.

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Section: Public Good Dilemmas In Nonlinear Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment

Cason

Gangadharan

2014

Exp Econ

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“…2 Related is the problem of retaliation for received punishment. Some studies find that re-taliation weakens decentralized punishment institutions because cooperative individuals are less willing to punish free riders (Denant-Boemont, Masclet, & Noussair, 2007;Nikiforakis, 2008;Nikiforakis, Noussair, & Wilkening, 2012), while others do not find such a general effect (Kamei & Putterman, 2015). Finally, decentralized punishment can become inefficient in increasing contributions when subjects receive only imperfect information about the contributions of others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information-sensitive Leviathans

Nicklisch

Grechenig

Thöni

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract We study information conditions under which individuals are willing to delegate their sanctioning power to a central authority. We design a public goods game in which players can move between institutional environments, and we vary the observability of others' contributions. We find that the relative popularity of centralized sanctioning crucially depends on the interaction between the observability of the cooperation of others and the absence of punishment targeted at cooperative individuals. While central institutions do not outperform decentralized sanctions under perfect information, large parts of the population are attracted by central institutions that rarely punish cooperative individuals in environments with limited observability. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…A growing number of studies in economics appeal to the influence of social norms to explain behaviors that are difficult to reconcile with models of rational choice, where individuals are assumed to care exclusively about their own material gain (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004;López-Pérez, 2008;Allcott, 2011;Nikiforakis et al, 2012;Gächter et al, 2013;Krupka and Weber, 2013;Reuben and Riedl, 2013). A recent development in experimental economics has allowed researchers to move toward a more objective approach to the identification and measurement of social norms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: Testing for order effects

d’Adda

Drouvelis

Nosenzo

2016

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment.

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Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement

Cited by 128 publications

References 39 publications

Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment

Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment

Information-sensitive Leviathans

Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: Testing for order effects

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