Information-sensitive Leviathans

Abstract

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Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

“…Empirically investigating the natural rise of governance could be regarded as investigating the creation of a leviathan29 in a laboratory. Recently, some research experimentally investigates how leviathans are built3031. This is an ambitious aim, and our idea is an important approach to investigate this topic.…”

Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation

“…Like Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach (2014), Nicklisch, Grechenig, and Thoeni (2016) only include uncoordinated peer punishment in the set of competing institutions; like us, they also allow for a central sanctioning authority. However, while they exogenously and permanently assign one subject to be the central authority, institution members elect our central authority each period, and the authority also bears part of the cost of punishment.…”

Corruption and Cooperation

“…7 Our findings also speak to the burgeoning literature studying cooperation in environments in which the punishment authority is centralized. Nicklisch et al (2016) show that, when information about others' contributions is imperfect, a large part of the individuals prefer to delegate their sanctioning rights to a centralized authority, provided that this centralized authority does not punish cooperative individuals. Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) show, using a lab-in-the-field experiment, that a centralized sanctioning authority can foster high levels of cooperation and that a democratically elected monitor is more successful at sustaining cooperation than a randomly elected monitor.…”