2014
DOI: 10.1111/etap.12014
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Nonfamily Managers, Family Firms, and the Winner's Curse: The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality

Abstract: We explain why family–centered noneconomic goals and bounded rationality decrease the willingness and ability of small– and medium–sized family firms to hire and provide competitive compensation to nonfamily managers even in a labor market composed of stewards rather than agents. Family–centered noneconomic goals attenuate the ability to attract high–quality, nonfamily managers by promoting inferior total compensation packages, fewer opportunities for advancement, idiosyncratic strategies, and higher performan… Show more

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Cited by 219 publications
(200 citation statements)
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References 96 publications
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“…Owing to the potential critical role of family business leaders on the development of OPC, as we suggested earlier, future research can explore this phenomenon through the lens of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory in family firms (Pearson & Marler, 2010). Additionally, family size, firm size, business life cycles, and generational differences (Chrisman et al, 2013) can play a role in shaping the OPC of family firms. All these suggest future research avenues for OPC of family firms.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 97%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Owing to the potential critical role of family business leaders on the development of OPC, as we suggested earlier, future research can explore this phenomenon through the lens of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory in family firms (Pearson & Marler, 2010). Additionally, family size, firm size, business life cycles, and generational differences (Chrisman et al, 2013) can play a role in shaping the OPC of family firms. All these suggest future research avenues for OPC of family firms.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…This is because family firms tend to accept or avoid risk to their economic performance owing to loss aversion concerning their socioemotional wealth, which can elevate noneconomic family firm performance. Indeed, family firms tend to be risk averse in order to protect socioemotional wealth to an extent that they may be willing to accept a greater economic performance hazard in order to preserve socioemotional wealth rooted in family-centered noneconomic goals (Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2013;Gomez-Mejia et al).…”
Section: Ccfg and Family Firm Economic And Noneconomic Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Whereas earlier research indicates that monitoring family employees can reduce costs and enhance family firm performance (Chrisman et al, ), our study is the first to link monitoring to a nonfinancial performance‐related consequence. As family firms have a variety of economic and noneconomic goals (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, ; Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, ), family firm CEOs and human resource managers need to be very careful in implementing control processes. Whereas these processes may facilitate performance, they can have undesirable effects on the overall portfolio of organizational goals and the degree to which family employees contribute to the family firm.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Uncertainty and equivocality naturally exist for nonfamily decision makers when determining the proper course of action to achieve goals that themselves may appear to be uncertain, if not idiosyncratic [70]. Clear communication is essential for removing such obstacles, but that is incumbent upon family and nonfamily members.…”
Section: Suggestions For Future Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%