Noncooperation by Popular Vote: Expectations, Foreign Intervention, and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum

Abstract

When popular referendums fail to ratify new international agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones, it not only affects domestic voters but also creates negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements. We explore how voters respond to this strategic environment. We use original survey data from a poll fielded just one day before the 2015 Greek bailout referendum—a referendum in which the stakes for other countries were particularly high—to investigate how expectations about the likely foreign response to a noncooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence those expectations. Our analysis of the Greek referendum shows that such expectations had a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a noncooperative referendum outcome would force Greece to leave the eurozone were substantially more likely to vote cooperatively than those believing that it would result in renewed negotiations with the country's creditors. Leveraging the bank closure that took place right before the vote, we also show that costly signals by foreign actors made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a noncooperative vote and substantially increased the share of cooperative votes.

National Sovereignty vs. International Cooperation: Policy Choices in Trade‐Off Situations

“…Likewise, 58% of Greek voters believed at the eve of the 2015 Greek bailout referendum that it would be possible to regain more policy autonomy without giving up the benefits of the single currency (Walter et al. ).…”

“…), the Greek 2015 bailout referendum (Walter et al. ) and anecdotal evidence from the Brexit referendum suggests for example that more highly educated voters are more aware of the constraints international integration implies for national policy‐making. Based on this literature, we would expect to find potentially cross‐pressured voters particularly among citizens with low levels of political sophistication, possibly even among politically alienated citizens.…”

“…2017; Jacobs and Matthews ; Walter et al. ). Empirically, we use data collected in the context of the 2015 Swiss parliamentary election, specifically the first wave of the Selects Panel/RCS study (SELECTS ).…”

Juncker's Curse? Identity, Interest, and Public Support for the Integration of Core State Powers

“…In the wake of the financial crisis, various studies have analysed attitudes to financial assistance. Some of these used very specific measures, including support for the European Stability Mechanism in Germany (Bechtel et al, 2014) and votes in bailout referenda in Greece and Iceland (Walter et al, 2018;Curtis et al, 2014). Others relied on general indicators of financial solidarity (Stoeckel and Kuhn, 2018;Verhaegen, 2018) or support for joint economic governance (Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014).…”

Designing Popular Vote Processes to Enhance Democratic Systems

“…: 23–27; Walter et al. : 2). A final dimension of the scope line of variation regards what counts as “one” issue that can be voted on in one ballot question.…”