Noncoherent Detection of Misbehaving Relays in Decode-and-Forward Cooperative Networks

Lo, Li-Chung; Huang, Wan-Jen; Chang, Ronald Y.; Chung, Wei-Ho

doi:10.1109/lcomm.2015.2429715

Cited by 17 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 14 publications

(21 reference statements)

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“…Relying on the a priori shared knowledge of cryptographic keys, the destination performs attack detection by checking whether or not its received data obeys the constraints imposed by the cryptographic keys. In [5]- [8], tracing symbols are inserted into the transmitted signal in the physical layer. Using these tracing symbols, the intended destination is capable of determining whether an attack has occurred or not by comparing the known and observed tracing symbols.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Byzantine Attacks Without Clean Reference

Cao,

Wong,

et al. 2016

Preprint

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We consider an amplify-and-forward relay network composed of a source, two relays, and a destination. In this network, the two relays are untrusted in the sense that they may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the destination. Note that every symbol received by the destination may be altered, and hence no clean reference observation is available to the destination. For this network, we identify a large family of Byzantine attacks that can be detected in the physical layer. We further investigate how the channel conditions impact the detection against this family of attacks. In particular, we prove that all Byzantine attacks in this family can be detected with asymptotically small miss detection and false alarm probabilities by using a sufficiently large number of channel observations if and only if the network satisfies a non-manipulability condition. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the detection of these attacks, demonstrating the value of this physical-layer security technique for counteracting Byzantine attacks.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Byzantine Attacks Without Clean Reference

Cao,

Wong,

et al. 2016

Preprint

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“…To identify the malicious 48 relays, the destination measures the error probability of the 49 observed tracing symbols, according to their a priori ground 50 truth. In [10]- [12], Lo et al applied a tracing-based method 51 to non-coherent detection in various scenarios, requiring no 52 channel state information (CSI). Note that the transmission 53 of tracing symbols also requires the support from a key-54 distribution mechanism.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…where K = g rs h rd h rs is unknown. According to (12), 926 we have Pr(X = x|Y 1 = y 1 )f 0 Y2|X (Y 2 = y 2 |X = x; g). 935 (56) 936…”

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confidence: 99%

Physical Detection of Misbehavior in Relay Systems With Unreliable Channel State Information

Yin

et al. 2018

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

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We study the detection of misbehavior in a Gaussian 1 relay system, where the source transmits information to the desti-2 nation with the assistance of an amplify-and-forward relay node 3 subject to unreliable channel state information (CSI). The relay 4 node may be potentially malicious and corrupt the network by 5 forwarding garbled information. In this situation, misleading 6 feedback may take place, since reliable CSI is unavailable at 7 the source and/or the destination. By classifying the action of 8 the relay as detectable or undetectable, we propose a novel 9 approach that is capable of coping with any malicious attack 10 detected and continuing to work effectively in the presence of 11 unreliable CSI. We demonstrate that the detectable class of 12 attacks can be successfully detected with a high probability. 13 Meanwhile, the undetectable class of attacks does not affect the 14 performance improvements that are achievable by cooperative 15 diversity, even though such an attack may fool the proposed 16 detection approach. We also extend the method to deal with the 17 case in which there is no direct link between the source and the 18 destination. The effectiveness of the proposed approach has been 19 validated by numerical results. 20 Index Terms-Physical layer security, integrity check, 21 unreliable CSI, cooperative relay communications.22

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“…These schemes are mainly enabled by utilizing tracing symbols, or self-information provided by network topology structure. In tracing-based schemes [7]- [10], source node inserts tracing symbols into a sequence of information bits, and then sends them together to the destination.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Relying on the priori knowledge of tracing symbols, the destination could detect attacks by comparing its observed tracing symbols and the ground truth of tracing symbols. This tracing-based method is applicable with perfect CSI [7], [8] or no need of CSI [9], [10] for varying network scenarios. The tracing-symbol based schemes commonly assume that the value and insertion location of the tracing symbols are known only at the source and the destination, which indeed requires a additional tracing-symbol distribution mechanism implemented between communication parties.…”

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confidence: 99%

Detecting Arbitrary Attacks Using Continuous Secured Side Information in Wireless Networks

Cao

2017

IEEE Access

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This paper focuses on Byzantine attack detection for Gaussian two-hop one-way relay network, where an amplify-and-forward relay may conduct Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the destination. For facilitating attack detection, we utilize the openness of wireless medium to make the destination observe some secured signals that are not attacked. Then, a detection scheme is developed for the destination by using its secured observations to statistically check other observations from the relay.On the other hand, notice the Gaussian channel is continuous, which allows the possible Byzantine attacks to be conducted within continuous alphabet(s). The existing work on discrete channel is not applicable for investigating the performance of the proposed scheme. The main contribution of this paper is to prove that if and only if the wireless relay network satisfies a nonmanipulable channel condition, the proposed detection scheme achieves asymptotic errorless performance against arbitrary attacks that allow the stochastic distributions of altered symbols to vary arbitrarily and depend on each other. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the detection. Furthermore, we also prove that the relay network is non-manipulable as long as all channel coefficients are non-zero, which is not essential restrict for many practical systems. I. INTRODUCTIONRelay nodes are widely employed in modern communication networks to enhance coverage and connectivity of the networks.This dependence on the relaying infrastructure may increase the risk on security as malicious relays may forward false information in order to deceive the intended participants into accepting counterfeit information. These attacks, referred to as Byzantine attacks, impose significant ramifications on the design of network protocols [1][2]. With the presence of Byzantine attacks, the attack detection technique, which determines whether Byzantine attacks are conducted or not, is one of the key steps supporting secure communication. R. Cao is with the the 2The work on attack detection starts above physical-layer, where each link is treated as a unit-capacity bit-pipe, while specific physical-layer characteristics are shielded. Based on this setting, cryptography keys are often used to make attacks detectable [3], [4], while requiring the cryptographic keys, to which the relays are not privy, to be shared between the source and destination before the communication takes place. Without using cryptography keys, information theoretic detection schemes are proposed for multicast system or Caterpillar Network [5], [6]. These schemes are able to achieve errorless performance in probability, yet assuming that at least one relay or link is absolutely trustworthy.Besides these schemes treating channels as noiseless bit-pipes, there are also many other attack detection schemes designed according to specific characteristics of physical-layer channels for varying application scenarios. These schemes are mainly enabled by utilizing tracing symbols, or ...

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Noncoherent Detection of Misbehaving Relays in Decode-and-Forward Cooperative Networks

Cited by 17 publications

References 14 publications

Detecting Byzantine Attacks Without Clean Reference

Detecting Byzantine Attacks Without Clean Reference

Physical Detection of Misbehavior in Relay Systems With Unreliable Channel State Information

Detecting Arbitrary Attacks Using Continuous Secured Side Information in Wireless Networks

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