Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT

Brands, Hal

doi:10.1080/14682740701474857

Cited by 39 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…After the ªrst meetings of the group, Germany agreed to give up the MLF in exchange for a permanent seat on the new consultative body. 134 But even though the September conference resolved the question of nuclear consultation, Johnson's continued pressure on Erhard for a full ªnancial offset prolonged the crisis, causing German decisionmakers to worry that imminent U.S. and British force withdrawals would lead to a "lasting weakening of the Atlantic Treaty" and expose Germany to Soviet military pressure. 135 Johnson hoped to placate domestic pressure from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansªeld to drastically reduce U.S. overseas deployments, but his strategy backªred-Erhard's coalition collapsed, and negotiations were delayed for months as Kiesinger formed his new government.…”

Section: Us Alliance Coercion 1963mentioning

confidence: 98%

Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Gerzhoy

2015

International Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When does a nucleararmed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? 1 The security model of nuclear proliferation argues that by providing extended deterrence to an insecure client, a patron obviates the client's need for indigenous nuclear weapons capabilities. 2 Underpinning this argument is the logic of "nuclear dependence," which posits that clients will prefer to delegate their security to a patron to avoid the risks associated with nuclear acquisition. For clients facing military threats, however, uncertainty about the durability and credibility of a patron's protection means that security guarantees are imperfect substitutes for independent capabilities. As a result, clients are compelled to minimize risks to their survival by pursuing both security guarantees and nuclear weapons of their own.Critics of the security model contend that this indeterminacy in its logic indicates that security guarantees cannot explain nuclear restraint, and that competing causal variables are necessary to account for client states' nuclear choices. In particular, past scholarship has largely turned to domestic factors to explain the choice of external reliance versus nuclear weapons acquisition, including the politico-economic preferences of a country's ruling coalition, the popularity of nonproliferation norms, the psychology of political leaders, and the prevalence of domestic actors with a veto over nuclear decisions. 3 These

show abstract

Section: Us Alliance Coercion 1963mentioning

confidence: 98%

Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Gerzhoy

2015

International Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, after a period in which the disclosure dilemma was resolved through other means than an IO, the U.S. turned back to the IAEA to address them. One review notes that the IAEA "must have been notified of US intelligence findings" as part of a 2003 finding by the Board of Governors about the North's non-compliance (Kleiner, 2005) (Brands, 2007;Gavin, 2010;Popp, 2014). 59 The two superpowers shared an interest in constraining the number of nuclear powers and, particularly since "states could also substitute nuclear weapons for their patronage and subsequently gain autonomy...[They thus] jointly tr [ied] to stop proliferation" (Coe and Vaynman, 2015b, 983).…”

Section: Withholding In the 1980s Sharing In The 1990smentioning

confidence: 99%

The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations

Carnegie

Carson

2017

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Countries that would have lain in the path of a main Warsaw Pact onslaught on the Central Front were less taken with the Bonn government hesitated to sign the NPT. 25 As the US willingness to defend NATO Europe with nuclear weapons was brought into question, one might have expected NATO's other two nuclear powers, both Britain and France, to step into the breach. France did not.…”

Section: The Containment Of Nuclear Proliferation In Europementioning

confidence: 99%

Britain and the Origins and Future of the European Defence and Security Mechanism

Heuser

2017

The RUSI Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Britain and the origins and future of the European defence and security mechanism Article Accepted Version Heuser, B. (2017) Britain and the origins and future of the European defence and security mechanism.Lessons learnt from history can be wrong or irrelevant, but one lesson that to a student of international relations seems both right and relevant seems to have been forgotten: that Britain's security depends on a peaceful Europe, that Europe's stability is enhanced by a firm British commitment to the defence of democratic states in Europe, and that the fine skills of British officials have been essential in overcoming many a crisis not only in transatlantic relations, but also in intra-European relations. Yet, today this carefully crafted defence mechanism of Europe, engineered above all by Britain, is crumbling.This mechanism and the rules to guide its employment took decades to construct, and Britain was one of the leading powers in initiating, amending and then fine-tuning it. In key periods, this was achieved along with France; in others mainly alongside the US and West Germany. It was a mechanism that allowed for dynamism, elasticity and perpetual adjustments to ever new events, which had to be accommodated without undermining the foundations of the entire structure.The British leaders and officials involved drew on centuries of failed experiments with alternative structures, all of which were eventually unable to keep the British Isles out of the two world wars, resulting in unprecedented numbers of casualties, damage and suffering. The mechanism, designed as much as cobbled together in ad hoc salvage operations by British politicians and defence planners, was at once robust and flexible, allowing it to weather a series of crises. But it relied and relies crucially on Britain as the central lynchpin keeping the construct together. The British withdrawal from the EU risks removing this central lynchpin, upon which the entire construct may come apart. The Channel Bridged by AirpowerCenturies of trial and error form the background to the construction of the current European defence mechanism. England and later Britain, along with most other European entities, had long embraced balance of power strategies. But while the rules of the balance-of-power game stopped any one power from dominating Europe, time and again, war was the main instrument available to beat rivalling expansionist powers.

show abstract

Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT

Cited by 39 publications

References 18 publications

Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations

Britain and the Origins and Future of the European Defence and Security Mechanism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About