The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations

Carnegie, Allison; Carson, Austin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3060677

Cited by 14 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 73 publications

(66 reference statements)

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“…See the discussion of the Iraq case in the appendix. On the IAEA's use of state-derived intelligence after 1991 to enable more aggressive monitoring, see Carnegie and Carson 2018.…”

Section: Discussion: Potential Regime Erosionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order

Carnegie¹,

Carson²

2018

Int Org

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How does publicizing states' illicit activities affect the stability of international order? What does this relationship tell us about how governments react to violations of international rules? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that transparent monitoring strengthens the normative legal order, we argue that these activities often undermine it. We develop two mechanisms through which this occurs: by raising the known rate of noncompliance, and by sharpening the threat that deviance poses to other states. We argue that when enforcers understand the dangers of publicizing transgressions, they do so selectively. Focusing on the nuclear nonproliferation domain, we demonstrate that these concerns shaped American decisions to reveal or obfuscate other states' efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. We formalize this argument and then empirically test the model's predictions using in-depth case study analyses. We find that the US failed to disclose infractions when this publicity would have undermined the rules through the two mechanisms we identify. However, while concealing violations can prevent proliferation in response to specific nuclear programs, it can also create potential dangers to a regime's overall health and stability. In addition to reassessing a widely shared assumption about the value of transparent monitoring, this article's broad theoretical framework can shed light on enforcement and compliance dynamics in a variety of international settings.

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“…See the discussion of the Iraq case in the appendix. On the IAEA's use of state-derived intelligence after 1991 to enable more aggressive monitoring, see Carnegie and Carson 2018.…”

Section: Discussion: Potential Regime Erosionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order

Carnegie¹,

Carson²

2018

Int Org

Self Cite

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“…Despite best efforts to keep these facilities concealed, and often precisely because of those efforts, the United States often succeeds in gathering some intelligence about latent programs (Montgomery and Mount 2014;Kemp 2014;Smith and Spaniel 2018). Over the past 70 years, the U.S. has primarily focused on preventing the spread of nuclear materials and technologies, especially to rogue actors that may pursue this form of ENR technology in secret, potentially aiming to revise or disrupt the status quo (Carnegie and Carson 2019). Countries who pursue their latency while purposefully concealing their efforts might raise suspicions, because the U.S. might interpret these deliberate efforts as a signal of intent to acquire nuclear weapons and desire to change the status quo.…”

Section: Nuclear Latency Ambiguity and Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5. There exists disagreement in the literature on how readily detectable latent programs and related technical capabilities are and whether measurement error is a potential concern (see Carnegie and Carson 2019;Kemp 2014;Smith and Spaniel 2018). As this literature suggests, there is some degree of variance in whether the United States is 'aware' of nuclear facilities.…”

Section: Orcid Idmentioning

confidence: 99%

Atomic Ambiguity: Event Data Evidence on Nuclear Latency and International Cooperation

Mattiacci

Mehta

Whitlark

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How does dual-use technology influence cooperation? This study explores how the development of nuclear latency (the technological precursors to nuclear weapons) affects U.S. cooperative overtures toward its possessors. We argue that the ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intentions of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Using event data, we find that a state’s possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is significantly correlated with greater cooperative overtures from the United States toward that country. These overtures may serve as effective tools to counter nuclear proliferation among these states. Yet, when latent states engage in a concerted effort to keep their facilities secret, both at the lab and a more advanced “pilot” stage, this relationship is reversed. These results carry important implications for the impact of emerging, dual-use technologies on international security broadly.

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“…1.See Yarhi-Milo (2013); Poznansky (2015); Carson (2016); Carson and Yarhi-Milo (2017); O’Rourke (2018); Carnegie and Carson (2019, 2020); Downes and O’Rourke (2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic Peace and Covert Military Force: An Experimental Test

Carnegie

Kertzer

Yarhi-Milo

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How should we reconcile covert war with normative theories of the democratic peace? Proponents argue that these interventions are consistent with democratic peace theory, as leaders intervene covertly to escape backlash by a public that has internalized liberal norms. Yet we know little about public opinion regarding the covert use of force. Using a survey experiment, we find that respondents are more favorable towards covert interventions against democratic targets than our theories assume, and that even citizens who value transparency the most still wrestle with a trade-off between their normative commitments and the instrumental benefits they perceive covert actions to hold. Our results thus help to explain why American leaders have repeatedly chosen to conduct covert military operations against fellow democracies, and raise important questions about the scope conditions of normative theories of the democratic peace.

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The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations

Cited by 14 publications

References 73 publications

The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order

The Spotlight's Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order

Atomic Ambiguity: Event Data Evidence on Nuclear Latency and International Cooperation

Democratic Peace and Covert Military Force: An Experimental Test

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