Non-kinetic hybrid threats in Europe – the Portuguese case study (2017-18)

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to understand whether Portugal, being a relatively peripheral country – in political, economic and military terms – of Southwest Europe, was recently a target of hybrid threats. The prevalence of a specific type of threat was found. Thus, this paper analyses the non-kinetic hybrid threats in Portugal, in a temporary hiatus of two years (2017–−2018). Design/methodology/approach This study has two parts: a conceptual analysis of hybrid threats created by us and, based on the typology previously presented, an analysis of the hybrid threats in Portugal between 2017 and 2018. The first part relied on source analysis, as the result of a desk review methodology, supported by monographs, declassified official documents and reports. The second part is also the result of source analysis, but more extensive. In addition to the desk review methodology, the study included semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders from the Portuguese security and armed forces, who asked not to be quoted. Media content analysis was also carried out – for trends and fact-check – mostly for the events related to the “narratives led operations” (for propaganda, misinformation, counter-information and strategic leaks). Findings To date, Portugal – compared with other European states – has not been a significant target for hybrid threats. It is diluted in the Portuguese geopolitical dimension. Nevertheless, not escaping what is happening in Europe, it has also been the target of non-kinetic hybrid threats, especially in cyberspace. In the field of so-called “narrative-driven operations”, there have been some occurrences – whether related to fake news, far-right movements or strategic leaks. In addition, cyberattacks from foreign groups for information and data gathering have increased in recent years, making governmental and private critical infrastructures more vulnerable. Research limitations/implications One of the characteristics of hybrid threats is their difficult identification. Therefore, information is scarce, which has complicated the research, leading us to assume, in many cases, speculation about the threat. It should also be taken into account that, in the case of cyberspace, until 2018, 90% of the occurrences were not reported, and the study has dealt with only official numbers. Originality/value It is not a policy paper. Although it neither points out national vulnerabilities to this type of threat nor makes procedural recommendations or considerations, it is fundamental in identifying the peculiarity of hybrid threats in a democratic state.

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“…The information is received and transmitted to analyse the social and political environment and manipulate the perception of reality through propaganda, fake news, strategic leaks, and State or parastatal news media (Duarte, 2020;Giannopoulos et al, 2020;Treverton et al, 2018;Wigell, 2020). However, information multiplies quickly and cheaply through social media platforms.…”

“…These have to do with perception and conditioning. Non-kinetic actions determine how and where the enemy does direct kinetic action, potentially preventing him from pursuing or, in another case, forcing him to direct it against himself (Duarte, 2020).…”

Sborník příspěvků z 11. mezinárodní vědecké konference REGION V ROZVOJI SPOLEČNOSTI 2023 / Proceedings of the 11th International Scientific Conference REGION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY 2023

“…Je přitom třeba vyhodnocovat i předchozí postupy, včetně například ne zcela jednoznačné akceptace dosavadní politiky proti dezinformacím v ČR. Současná "anti-dezinformační" dominance politiky proti hybridním hrozbám navíc nemusí být dostačující v případě objevení se nových forem hybridního působení v našem geografickém prostoru, a je třeba se připravit na specifické kombinace kinetických a nekinetických hybridních hrozeb, včetně možné inspirace u jiných zemí (Duarte 2020).…”

“Information disorder” campaigns in natural hazards and extreme events –a form of foreign influence and a hybrid threat?

“…Hybrid threats result from a strategy based on a broad and multidimensional combination of conventional and unconventional methods, with open and covert actions implemented by military, paramilitary, or civilian actors. The main objective of a hybrid threat is to create political and social destabilisation, reflecting this impact on governments and opponent institutions by creating chaos and a power vacuum (Duarte, 2020(Duarte, , 2023Giannopoulos et al, 2020;Treverton et al, 2018).…”

“…These have to do with perception and conditioning. Non-kinetic actions determine how and where the enemy does direct kinetic action, potentially preventing him from pursuing or, in another case, forcing him to direct it against himself (Duarte, 2020). These actions are not mutually exclusive and sometimes overlap.…”