Non-discriminatory Rules and Ethnic Representation: The Election of the Bosnian State Presidency

Abstract

The electoral system for the state presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina guarantees the representation of the three constituent people, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, but it violates the political rights of other ethnic minorities and of citizens who do not identify themselves with any ethnic group. Following the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Bosnia was urged to reform its electoral law. This paper discusses alternative practices of ethnically based political representation and their possible application in the Bosnian state presidency elections. Several innovative electoral models that satisfy fair political and legal criteria for desirable electoral dynamics in divided societies can be envisaged in the Bosnian context. Specifically, these are: the introduction of a single countrywide electoral district, the adoption of the single non-transferable vote, and the application of a geometrical mean rule. They guarantee the representation of the three constituent people, while strengthening inter-ethnic voting and giving chances to non-nationalist candidates to be elected.

Online ethnic segregation in a post-conflict setting

“…Bosnia and Herzegovina is representative for a country where ethnic identity and ethnic divisions transcend into public administration and politics. Bosnia’s constitution sets out three ethnically defined ‘constituent people’: ethnic Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats (Bochsler, 2012; Claridge, 2010; Milanovic, 2010). Most political parties are linked to one of the three ethnic groups (Šedo, 2010).…”

From Dayton to Bernese Jura: The Election of the Croat Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

“…Among all the suggested models for the election of the Presidency, some are based on the geometric mean (Hodžić & Stojanović, 2011; Bochsler, 2012). Hodžić and Stojanović suggest the formation of one electoral unit that comprises the entire state.…”

Simulation of the Implementation of the Single Transferable Vote in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Case of Elections for the Parliamentary Assembly in 2000

“…STV karakterišu manje višemandatne izborne jedinice 6 kao što je i slučaj u Bosni i Hercegovini. 7 Prilikom preračunavanja glasova u mandate STV koristi Droop quota, a list-PR metod Sainte-Lague, pri čemu su oba metoda u velikoj mjeri podudarna sa stanovišta proporcionalnosti (Farrell 2001;Lijphart 1986). Jedina suštinska razlika između ova dva sistema je u načinu glasanja: kod najpoznatijih primjera gdje se koristi STV, poput Irske, Sjeverne Irske i Malte, moguće je rangirati kandidate (dodjelјivati preferencije 1,2,3...) iz različitih stranaka, dok je kod list-PR dozvolјeno dati glas samo jednoj stranci ili kandidatima unutar liste.…”

“…DanielBochsler (2012) je koristio sličan pristup simulacije izbornih ishoda centripetalističke škole na primjeru reformi izbora članova Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine. Bochsler je došao do zaključaka kako bi jedinstvena izborna jedinica u cijeloj državi za izbor članova Predsjedništva, uvođenje petočlanog državnog Predsjedništva (umjesto trenutnog tročlanog), i upotreba većinskog sistema jednostrukog neprenosivog glasa doveli do međuetničkog glasanja i podsticanja kandidata da se obraćaju biračima preko etničkih linija.…”