No more colour! Authoritarian regimes and colour revolutions in Eurasia

Finkel, Evgeny; Brudny, Yitzhak M.

doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.641298

Cited by 57 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…With regard to the eastern neighbourhood, the 'interests trump values' argument has seen EU democracy support taken hostage by the 'Russia first' policy privileged by the majority of EU member states, which favours a policy of non-confrontation with Russia, the other regional player with a stake in the political trajectories of the countries in the region (Popescu 2010). Russia has not only opposed the pro-Western orientation of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) states, but has also tried to cement the non-democratic status quo, fearing a spillover effect of any pro-democracy mobilisation in Eastern Europe on the current Kremlin regime (Finkel and Brudny 2012). The EU, for its part, has cautiously supported pro-democracy advances in willing partners and avoided an all-out confrontation with Russia over the fate of common neighbours.…”

Section: Explaining the Unintended Consequences Of Eu Democracy Suppomentioning

confidence: 99%

Unintended Consequences of EU Democracy Support in the European Neighbourhood

Dandashly

Noutcheva

2019

The International Spectator

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The European Union's (EU) impact on the political governance of the European neighbourhood is varied and sometimes opposite to the declared objectives of its democracy support policies. The democracy promotion literature has to a large extent neglected the unintended consequences of EU democracy support in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. The EU has left multiple imprints on the political trajectories of the countries in the neighbourhood and yet the dominant explanation, highlighting the EU's security and economic interests in the two regions, cannot fully account for the unintended consequences of its policies. The literature on the 'pathologies' of international organisations offers an explanation, emphasizing the failures of the EU bureaucracy to anticipate, prevent or reverse the undesired effects of its democracy support in the neighbourhood.

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Section: Explaining the Unintended Consequences Of Eu Democracy Suppomentioning

confidence: 99%

Unintended Consequences of EU Democracy Support in the European Neighbourhood

Dandashly

Noutcheva

2019

The International Spectator

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“…In addition, the instability in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, where repeated protests brought down the rule of Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010, prompted fears of similar events in Kazakhstan. The possibility of contagion related to a new wave of color revolutions was perceived as a serious threat by the authorities, and led to a number of restrictive measures (Finkel and Brudny, 2012). However, these same concerns led the regime to seek to enhance its image of being a responsive and responsible government.…”

Section: The Party As a Vehicle Of Government Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This organization monitors and mobilizes the youth population both during elections and non-electoral periods by sponsoring meetings, conferences and trips to other cities. This initiative's primary functions are probably connected with the need to demonstrate the regime's strength while keeping young people away from the ranks of the opposition, particularly given the ongoing fear of contagion from external color revolutions (Robertson, 2007;Finkel and Brudny, 2012). However, the organization genuinely gives many youth the feeling that they are engaged more deeply in public affairs than would otherwise be possible, as well as the impression that they could one day become part of the establishment themselves (Zhas Otan members 1 and 2, 2011).…”

Section: The Party As a Vehicle Of Government Responsivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legitimation and the Party of Power in Kazakhstan

Sordi¹

2016

Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia

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This chapter surveys the legitimation strategies enacted by the political leadership of the contemporary post-Soviet republic. While showing that Kazakhstan bases its legitimation primarily on international recognition and the country's economic performance, it also focuses on an institutional dimension of legitimation. The leadership of Kazakhstan has chiefly been relying on Nur Otan, the party of power, for this. The party has contributed to legitimation by enforcing rules in the 1990s; by channeling popular support for the regime's economic performance in the 2000s; and finally by becoming more responsive to citizens' requests, thus shifting the regime toward input-related legitimation in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. IntroductionThe goal of the present volume is to shed light on the importance of legitimation for authoritarian-regime stability, focusing in particular on institutional legitimacy in post-Soviet Eurasia. i The case of Kazakhstan is extremely relevant for this purpose: Governed by a soft authoritarian regime, the country is endowed with significant natural resources and yet deploys advanced forms of institutional legitimation, especially through its party of power.Moreover, the analysis of this case shows that modes of legitimation can vary over time, with shifts largely depending on the historical, economic and political conditions of the moment.This chapter begins with a review of the main legitimating frames considered and in some cases adopted by Kazakhstan's leadership. A reliance on international recognition and strong economic performance, two of the most successful strategies, are examined in particular. In the same section, the need for an institutional dimension for legitimation is explored.Institutions, it is argued, are needed to buttress, channel and at times provide a substitute for 1 This chapter is going to be published in an edited volume published thanks to the efforts and the support of the KomPost research network. The reference is Del Sordi, A. (2016) "Legitimation and the Party of Power in Kazakhstan" in J. Ahrens, M. Brusis and M. Schulze Wessel (eds) Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

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“…Generally, the literature on the colored revolutions in postcommunist politics has focused largely on either macrostructural or economic reasons for their occurrence (Radnitz, ; Way, ; Nikolayenko, ), the diffusion of colored revolutions across the region (Beissinger, ; for a criticism, see Way, ), regime reactions to colored revolutions (especially to contain or preempt such revolts) (Finkel and Brudny, ; Silitsky, ; Way, ), or the individual psychological factors and motivations for participation in mass protests that led to the color revolutions in the first place (Beissinger, ; Tucker, ). Further, there has been some limited work on the political consequences of the colored revolutions (see, for instance, Kalandadze and Orenstein, ; Ostrowski, ) but this work has focused on macro‐level political consequences (such as the emergence of democracy) or on a single country (Beissinger, ; Ostrowski, ).…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Colored Revolutions, Interpersonal Trust, and Confidence in Institutions: The Consequences of Mass Uprisings*

Ishiyama

Pechenina

2016

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective. Recent upheavals in the Middle East raise a number of questions regarding the consequences of mass uprisings. We examine the impact that earlier peaceful revolutions had on interpersonal and institutional trust in the postcommunist world. Methods. Data were collected from eight countries using two waves from the World Values Survey, three of which had experienced a colored revolt. The article uses mixed effects logit analysis and quasi-experimental techniques. Results. Levels of social trust are much less in countries where a colored revolution occurred than in countries that had not experienced such an uprising. However, confidence in political institutions increased in contrast to countries that had not experienced an uprising. Conclusion. The level of interpersonal trust is not necessarily connected to the level of institutional trust. The decline in interpersonal trust in post-colored-revolution societies does not bode well for the development of democracy after mass upheaval. TX 76203-5017 John.Ishiyama@unt.edu . The authors will share all data and coding for replication purposes.1 Although recognizing that there is much conceptual debate in the literature on the definition of "revolutions" in this article, we refer to these uprisings in postcommunist countries as "revolutions" since they were referred to in this way by the popular media and the press. Further, although it could be argued that what occurred was not "revolutionary" in that no "progress" toward democracy was made afterward, in this article we conceptualize "revolutionary" as simply the collapse of the previous political administration and its replacement with the opposition as the result of mass protests over fraudulent election results.2 To be sure, we do not wish to make universal claims that stretch far beyond the countries included in this study, which are all in one region of the world, all of which were postcommunist, and all of which were semi-authoritarian regimes. Thus we do not claim that the findings apply to all popular uprisings (such as SOCIAL

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No more colour! Authoritarian regimes and colour revolutions in Eurasia

Cited by 57 publications

References 27 publications

Unintended Consequences of EU Democracy Support in the European Neighbourhood

Unintended Consequences of EU Democracy Support in the European Neighbourhood

Legitimation and the Party of Power in Kazakhstan

Colored Revolutions, Interpersonal Trust, and Confidence in Institutions: The Consequences of Mass Uprisings*

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