No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief

Abstract

Recently it has been increasingly popular to argue that knowledge is the norm of belief. I present an argument against this view. The argument trades on the epistemic situation of the subject in the bad case. Notably, unlike with other superficially similar arguments against knowledge norms, knowledge normers preferred strategy of appealing to the distinction between permissibility and excusability cannot help them to rebut this argument.

The knowledge norm of belief

“…4 Different knowledge norms are defended by, for example, Williamson (2000), Smithies (2012a), Gibbons (2013), Engel (2013), and Littlejohn (2013). 5 See, for example, Hughes (2017) and Fassio (2018). 6 One might wonder why we are focusing on narrow scope knowledge norms, given that some prominent defenders of these norms construe them with a wide scope ought (Williamson, 2000).…”

Who's Afraid of Epistemic Dilemmas?

“…Unlike deniers, they maintain that both of the conflicting 'oughts' are real, but they argue that there isn't really a conflict between them, because one of them is weightier or somehow more important than the other. Granted that the thieves ought to believe that p 6 I used to think this (Hughes 2017(Hughes , 2019b.…”

You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework

“…(Indeed, Willard-Kyle's ultimate view ends up close to the converse of my own, accepting a knowledge norm of belief, but rejecting the knowledge norm of assertion in favour of a position-to-know norm of assertion, similar to the one I will discuss for belief in §4 below. )17 In these abbreviations, K is for knowledge, A and B are for assertion and belief, g is for governing, and o is for a negative 'ought' norm.18 For critiques of the knowledge norm of belief along these lines, seeMcGlynn (2013),Hughes (2017),Schechter (2017, p. 138). For replies, see Littlejohn (forthcoming),Williamson (forthcoming).…”