The knowledge norm of belief

Swindlehurst, Zachary Mitchell

doi:10.1002/tht3.441

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…What conception of inquiry must the defender of zetetic epistemology be committed to if they are to explain the rationality of beliefs like Giada's? It's noteworthy that a broader conception of inquiry, which includes beliefs formed automatically via perception, is at odds with a very prevalent approach to inquiry as an intentional and goaldirected activity that involves inquiring attitudes, such as curiosity and wonder Sapir and van Elswyk;Forth;Willard-Kyle;forthcoming).…”

Section: Zetetically Useless Yet Rationalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?

Falbo

2023

Philos Stud

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What is the relationship between inquiry and epistemology? Are epistemic norms the norms that guide us as inquirers-as agents in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding? Recently, there has been growing support for what I, following Friedman (2020), will call the zetetic turn in epistemology, the view that all epistemic norms are norms of inquiry. This paper investigates the prospects of an inquiry-centered approach to epistemology and develops several motivations for resisting it. First, I argue that the norms of inquiry are most plausibly seen as practical, not as distinctively epistemic. Second, I argue that a zetetically-grounded epistemology is unable to properly account for the rationality of belief. It fails to account for cases where intuitively irrational beliefs promote inquiry, or where intuitively rational beliefs are zetetically useless or counterproductive to inquiry. The main upshot is this: there must be a source of epistemic normativity that isn't ultimately zetetic.

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Section: Zetetically Useless Yet Rationalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?

Falbo

2023

Philos Stud

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“…3 Not all normativists appeal to a truth norm. For instance, some hold instead that belief is essentially guided by a knowledge norma norm that links one's obligation to believe that p with her knowing (or at least being in a position to know) that p. I discuss this issue in Swindlehurst (2020).…”

Section: Introduction: Belief Normativismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blind rule-following and the regress of motivations

Swindlehurst

2020

Inquiry

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Normativists about belief hold that belief formation is essentially rule-or norm-guided. On this view, certain norms are constitutive of or essential to belief in such a way that no mental state not guided by those norms counts as a belief, properly construed. In recent influential work, Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss develop novel arguments against normativism. According to their regress of motivations argument, not all belief formation can be rule-or norm-guided, on pain of a vicious infinite regress. I argue that the regress of motivations argument is unsuccessful: an appeal to the notion of blind rule-following, drawn from a plausible interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following, stops the regress of motivations in its tracks.

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“…For some representative defences of this view, see, e.g.,Williamson (2002),Gibbons (2013),Littlejohn (2013), Swindlehurst (2020. For an overview, seeBenton (2014).2 See Williamson (2016).3 SeeWilliamson (2021, 12).…”

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confidence: 99%

Collateral Conflicts and Epistemic Norms

Carter¹

2021

Epistemic Dilemmas

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This paper focuses on a specific kind of (epistemic) normative conflict, collateral normative conflict -viz., where cognition's working badly at the global level of general dispositions to believe is the price to be paid for its working well locally. I argue that such normative conflicts are much rarer than Williamson (2021) and Lasonen-Aarnio ( 2010) take them to be, even though, and contra proponents of revisionary defeat (e.g., Brown 2018), knowers can, as Williamson and Lasonen-Aarnio rightly maintain, at least sometimes disregard misleading evidence from reliable sources. My rationale for the rarity of collateral epistemic conflicts draws from recent insights by Sosa (2021) on the appropriateness of aiming, in certain domains of inquiry, not just at knowledge, but at knowledge firsthand. A consequence of the rationale offered, however, is that an entirely different kind of normative conflict -what I call cross-modal normative conflictturns out to be much more common than appreciated.

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The knowledge norm of belief

Cited by 7 publications

References 27 publications

Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?

Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?

Blind rule-following and the regress of motivations

Collateral Conflicts and Epistemic Norms

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