No conscientious objection without normative justification: Against conscientious objection in medicine

Abstract

Most proponents of conscientious objection accommodation in medicine acknowledge that not all conscientious beliefs can justify refusing service to a patient. Accordingly, they admit that constraints must be placed on the practice of conscientious objection. I argue that one such constraint must be an assessment of the reasonability of the conscientious claim in question, and that this requires normative justification of the claim. Some advocates of conscientious object protest that, since conscientious claims are a manifestation of personal beliefs, they cannot be subject to this kind of public justification. In order to preserve an element of constraint without requiring normative justification of conscientious beliefs, they shift the justificatory burden from the belief motivating the conscientious claim to the condition of the patient being refused service. This generally involves a claim along the lines that conscientious refusals should be permitted to the extent that they do not cause unwarranted harm to the patient. I argue that explaining what would constitute warranted harm requires an explanation of what it is about the conscientious claim that makes the harm warranted. ‘Warranted’ is a normative operator, and providing this explanation is the same as providing normative justification for the conscientious claim. This shows that resorting to facts about the patient’s condition does not avoid the problem of providing normative justification, and that the onus remains on advocates of conscientious objection to provide normative justification for the practice in the context of medical care.

Quotas: Enabling Conscientious Objection to Coexist with Abortion Access

“…Often enough, those who are opposed to conscientious objection do not wish to see any procedures denied, irrespective of criteria that might limit the scope of objections. Some are suspicious that individuals may lie or exaggerate their beliefs [ 19 ] or base their objections on idiosyncratic or discriminatory beliefs [ 50 , 62 ]. These concerns are not unfounded—for instance, there have been reports of doctors refusing to provide abortion services on grounds other than legitimate conscientious objection [ 37 ], such as because of stigma or financial implications for their private practice [ 13 ].…”

Rethinking Acts of Conscience: Personal Integrity, Civility, and the Common Good

“…Traditional liberal justifications include toleration for moral diversity, respect for individual autonomy, respect for moral integrity, the need to maintain liberal neutrality, and the opportunity to provide an alternative means for political participation and democratic protest. 2 More libertarian 1 For some discussions of the Compromise View, see Wicclair (2000), Asch (2006), Brock (2008), and Zolf (2019); for the Incompatibility Thesis, see Savulescu (2006), Leiter (2013), Schuklenk (2005), Giulbini (2017). and Savulescu and Schuklenk (2017); and for Conscience Absolutism, see Wicclair (2011, Ch.…”

“…For defense of the stronger demand of 'reasonableness' rather than 'minimal rationality', see, for example,Rawls (2005), Brownlee (2012),Smith (2013),Zolf (2019), andCard (2020).…”

“… 1 For some discussions of the Compromise View, see Wicclair (2000), Asch (2006), Brock (2008), and Zolf (2019); for the Incompatibility Thesis, see Savulescu (2006), Leiter (2013), Schuklenk (2005), Giulbini (2017). and Savulescu and Schuklenk (2017); and for Conscience Absolutism, see Wicclair (2011, Ch.…”

Priziv savjesti kod zdravstvenih djelatnika – osnovno ljudsko pravo?

“…2010. [29,5] Članci Pravo na priziv savjesti Ponekad su osobna, etička uvjerenja zdravstvenih djelatnika u suprotnosti s utvrđenim društvenim normama pružanja zdravstvene zaštite.…”