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Green, Jeffrey; Sedikides, Constantine

doi:10.1023/a:1010611922816

Cited by 37 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Furthermore, aspects of the individual-self permeate social relations. Self-schemata organize and guide the processing of information about others (Dunning, 1999; Green & Sedikides, 2001), and they are readily and frequently projected on others (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Krueger, 2000). Indeed, the individual self is used as the epistemic platform for the formation of knowledge about the collective self: Participants rely on individual-self knowledge to form an impression of the in-group in minimal-group situations (Gramzow, Gaertner, & Sedikides, 2001; Otten & Wentura, 2001).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The "I," the "we," and the "when": A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition.

Gaertner¹,

Sedikides²,

Vevea³

et al. 2002

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Self Cite

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What is the primary motivational basis of self-definition? The authors meta-analytically assessed 3 hypotheses: (a) The individual self is motivationally primary, (b) the collective self is motivationally primary, and (c) neither self is inherently primary; instead, motivational primacy depends on which self becomes accessible through contextual features. Results identified the individual self as the primary motivational basis of self-definition. People react more strongly to threat and enhancement of the individual than the collective self. Additionally, people more readily deny threatening information and more readily accept enhancing information when it pertains to the individual rather than the collective self, regardless of contextual influences. The individual self is the psychological home base, a stable system that can react flexibly to contextual influences.The right of nature . . . is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life.-Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.-Nathan Hale, spoken at his deathThe self is in a continual process of construction, it cannot be adequately made up excepting in terms of the content which it supplies for the situation in which the agent has to act. -John Dewey, Lectures on Psychological and Political EthicsThis article is concerned with a fundamental issue in psychology, education, social sciences, and humanities: Does the self-concept have a motivational hierarchy? Do all selves (i.e., self-definitions) have equal motivational potential? Which selfdefinition is motivationally primary?We distinguish among three theoretical approaches to the issue. The first approach, one example of which is Hobbes's statement, posits that the individual self is motivationally primary. The second approach, exemplified by Hale's proclamation, maintains that the collective self is motivationally primary. The third approach advocates that neither self is inherently primary. Instead, the self that is more accessible through situational or contextual influences is motivationally primary-a proposition that is in spirit with Dewey's thinking.We articulate the three theoretical approaches and review relevant research. We argue that, when considered alone, each approach appears to be supported. However, independent tests, per se, tell only part of the story. Comparative tests provide a more refined solution to the problem. We report a meta-analysis of empirical studies relevant to the issue of relative motivational status.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The "I," the "we," and the "when": A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition.

Gaertner¹,

Sedikides²,

Vevea³

et al. 2002

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…When an individual's "self" is unstable (Clarkin et al, 2007), the individual's identity fluctuations may influence how they interpret and therefore how they report their identity. Their current self-perspective becomes a distortion lens through which they perceive their behaviors and experiences (Green & Sedikides, 2001). While informants do not have direct access to the target's fluctuating internal or self-perceptions, they can make inferences from a stable vantage point.…”

Section: Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Self and informant report across the borderline personality disorder spectrum.

Balsis¹,

Loehle-Conger²,

Busch³

et al. 2018

Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment

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Individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD) features may be unaware of or unwilling to report their own personality or maladaptive behaviors, which complicates the assessment of BPD. Informants who know the individuals with BPD features may be uniquely suited to aid in the personality assessment of these individuals. The present study analyzed the comparative ability of individuals (targets) and informants to report BPD features across the continuum of BPD severity. The sample consisted of 1387 targets, ages 55 to 65 (56% women), who were recruited for an epidemiological longitudinal study examining the effects of PDs on health and social functioning. Each target nominated an informant who provided information about the target's personality. Results indicated relatively low levels of agreement between perspectives and that informants reported BPD symptoms with more precision and at lower levels of BPD severity than targets. The benefits of including an informant perspective when measuring the BPD continuum are discussed; these benefits may include gains in reliability and improvement in the prediction of outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record

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“…Within the shared category of favorably evaluated entities, we assume that the self is the superordinate entity. This assumption rests on the fact that the self is habitually treated as a superordinate comparison standard in comparative contexts (e.g., Green & Sedikides, 2001; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1993; Srull & Gaelick, 1983). Because the self is typically rated higher than the average peer on most trait dimensions (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003), this suggests that the subordinate object (i.e., the average peer) will be assimilated toward the superordinate one (i.e., the self).…”

Section: Variations Of the Anchoring-and-adjustment Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deconstructing the better-than-average effect.

Guenther

Alicke

2010

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

100

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The tendency for people to evaluate themselves more favorably than an average-peer--the better-than-average effect (BTAE)--is among the most well-documented effects in the social-psychological literature. The BTAE has been demonstrated in many populations with various methodologies, and several explanations have been advanced for it. Two essential questions remain conspicuously unanswered in the BTAE literature. The first concerns the extent to which the BTAE can be represented as a social-comparative phenomenon, and the second concerns the role that strategic motivational processes play in self versus average-peer judgments. With regard to the first question, Study 1 provides direct experimental evidence that self versus average-peer judgments are made relationally rather than independently and, further, that self-ratings anchor these relational judgments. Moreover, Study 1 demonstrates that the consequence of this comparison is for judgments of average to be assimilated toward, not contrasted from, self-ratings. Studies 2-4 provide evidence that self-enhancement motives play a moderating role in the outcome of self versus average-peer judgments. We show that for dimensions on which the self is positively evaluated, enhancement motives restrict the extent to which average-peer assimilation occurs (Study 2). But for dimensions on which the self is negatively evaluated, enhancement motives amplify average-peer assimilation (Studies 3 and 4). Discussion focuses on the function of such differential assimilation, the relation of the current findings to extant perspectives, and directions for future research.

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Cited by 37 publications

References 40 publications

The "I," the "we," and the "when": A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition.

The "I," the "we," and the "when": A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition.

Self and informant report across the borderline personality disorder spectrum.

Deconstructing the better-than-average effect.

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