Deconstructing the better-than-average effect.

Guenther, Corey L.; Alicke, Mark D.

doi:10.1037/a0020959

Cited by 100 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 95 publications

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“…Alicke et al, 1995;Burson et al, 2006;Guenther & Alicke, 2010;Moore & Small, 2007), leading them to make inaccurate performance judgements (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003;Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), the observed results are particularly interesting.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 93%

The role of gender, task success probability estimation and scores as predictors of the domain-masculine intelligence type (DMIQ)

Storek

Furnham

2016

Learning and Individual Differences

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This paper reports two experimental studies aimed at understanding correlates of self-estimated intelligence. In both studies participants twice estimated their mathematical and spacial intelligence (called Domain Masculine Intelligence Type: DMIQ) on a normal distribution. They also completed a number of short numerical and logical ability tests after which they estimated their performance at a similar, more difficult task. Males gave higher estimates than females and did better on the tests. Their estimates of their DMIQ reduced on the second occasion after testing. Gender, task score and estimated performance were all significant predictors of both DMIQ scores. Task confidence was the best predictor of DMIQ1 and DMIQ2, over and above gender and test score, explaining 17% and 23% of variance respectively. Results are discussed in terms of the expanding literature on self-estimated intelligence 2

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 93%

The role of gender, task success probability estimation and scores as predictors of the domain-masculine intelligence type (DMIQ)

Storek

Furnham

2016

Learning and Individual Differences

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“…We see this exhibited in many of the biases identified in the literature. The self-centeredness is found in the general human tendency to use the self as an anchor against which the other is compared and the world is known (Dunning, Krueger, & Alicke, 2005;Guenther & Alicke, 2010). We are biased toward that which comes fastest and most easily to mind, (availability or representative heuristic, Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), which is often thoughts about the self (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 2002;Kruger, 1999).…”

Section: §322 Accuracy and Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

Samuelson¹,

Church

2014

Philosophical Psychology

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In this paper we explore the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology, specifically highlighting the two major positions-agent-reliabilism and agentresponsibilism (or neo-Aristotelianism)-as they apply to dual systems theories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases. We investigate under which conditions heuristics and biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be attributed to an inappropriate reliance on Type 1, or the improper function of Type 2 cognitive processes. By the same token, the proper intervention of Type 2 processes results in the virtuous functioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism). Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cognitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for one's judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and exposure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify the proper use of Type 2 cognitive processes and the habits of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the nature of these habits and the contribution of personality traits, situational pressures, and training in their cultivation. §1. IntroductionAny account of knowing has, as its starting point, the capacity and desire to know the "truth," through whatever normative criteria the "truth" can be established. Yet, human beings are notoriously (and apparently naturally) disposed to over-estimate their capacity to know the truth and under-estimate their weaknesses (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996;Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995;Evans, 2007; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002;Kunda, 1990;Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007;Stanovich & West, 1997;Wegener & Petty, 1997). Indeed, the evidence is clear that there is a strong tendency even to under-estimate our liability to such biases (Pronin & Kugler, 2007)! Furthermore, we are susceptible to all sorts of biases that make knowing difficult. For example, we tend to favor evidence or data received early in our inquiries (Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009) and we tend to discount the weight of evidence that counts against hypotheses we endorse (Nickerson, 1998). Second, evolutionary psychologists have offered some intriguing arguments that these dispositions are embedded within our cognitive architecture in ways that can systematically lead us to biased thinking, in some cases for adaptive reasons (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Our intention here is to apply some principles and distinctions from virtue epistemology to the literature on cognitive heuristics and biases to gain a better understanding of the promise and perils of our cognitive systems. We will examine questions of how and under what circumstances these heuristics and biases can be characterized as epistemic vices and how the specific epistemic virtue of intellectual humility may help mitigate these vi...

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“…If optimism can be defined as the tendency to see everything through a positive lens, self-enhancement is people's tendency to see themselves as better than the average (Alicke, 1985;Guenther and Alicke, 2010;Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Distance between Perception and Reality in the Social Domains of Life

Lora

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws.Copyright © Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. The distance between perception and reality with respect to the social domains of life is often striking. Using survey data collected on Latin American countries, this paper provides an overview of the main empirical findings on the gaps between perception and reality in four social domains-health, employment, the perception of security, and social ranking. The overview emphasizes the psychological biases that may explain the gaps. Biases associated with cultural values are very relevant with respect to health and job satisfaction. Cultural differences across countries are pronounced in perceptions of health, while cultural differences across socioeconomic groups are more apparent with respect to job satisfaction. Affect and availability heuristics are the dominant sources of bias in the case of perceptions of security. The formation of subjective social rankings appears to be less culturally dependent but more dependent on the socioeconomic development in the country. The gaps between objective and subjective indicators in the social domains of life are a rich source of data to help understand how perceptions are formed, identify important aspects of people's lives that do not appear in official indicators, inform public debate on social policy, and shed light on public attitudes on key social issues. Cataloging-in-Publication JEL Codes: I19, J28, Z13

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Deconstructing the better-than-average effect.

Cited by 100 publications

References 95 publications

The role of gender, task success probability estimation and scores as predictors of the domain-masculine intelligence type (DMIQ)

The role of gender, task success probability estimation and scores as predictors of the domain-masculine intelligence type (DMIQ)

When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology

The Distance between Perception and Reality in the Social Domains of Life

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