Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Interpretation

Cox, Christoph

doi:10.5840/intstudphil199527378

Cited by 34 publications

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“…Old Dominion University USA jremhof@odu.edu ENDNOTES 1 For prominent non-constructivist readings, see Clark (1990), Leiter (1994), Hales and Welshon (2000), Doyle (2009), and Nola (1987, 1999. For challenges to these readings, see Remhof (2015a), (2017).…”

Section: Justin Remhofmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Defending Nietzsche's Constructivism about Objects

Remhof

2017

European J of Philosophy

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Nietzsche appears to adopt a radical Kantian view of objects called constructivism, which holds that the existence of all objects depends essentially on our practices. This essay provides a new reconstruction of Nietzsche's argument for constructivism and responds to five pressing objections to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist that have not been addressed by commentators defending constructivist interpretations of Nietzsche.In the tradition of Kant and post-Kantian philosophy, Nietzsche was attentive to questions concerning the nature of objects. His texts often address questions concerning the existence and non-existence of objects, the relation of objects to human minds, and how different views of objects impact commitments in many areas of philosophy-not just metaphysics but also epistemology, semantics, science, and even ethics. I have argued (Remhof 2015a), along with Nehamas (1985: Ch. 3), Anderson (1998), and Cox (1999: 152-163), that Nietzsche adopts a radical Kantian view of objects called constructivism.1 This view holds that all objects are socially constructed. Specifically, the existence of all objects we can encounter, such as rocks, trees, and planets, depends essentially on the application of concepts to the world relative to our needs, interests, and values. Nietzsche writes that 'A "thing" is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept ' 2 'Thing' is presumably scare-quoted because constructivism is unorthodox. After all, commonsense intuition strongly suggests that many objects are not socially constructed. But I am not concerned with the truth of constructivism here. Rather, my primary aim is to address objections to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist about objects, specifically objections that other constructivist readers have overlooked.The paper unfolds as follows. I first provide a new reconstruction of Nietzsche's argument for constructivism. The bulk of the essay then addresses five problems with reading Nietzsche as a constructivist. Briefly, here are the objections. First, in a famous passage, Nietzsche appears to embrace the eliminativist view that objects do not exist. Second, constructivism appears to involve taking the world to have human features, and Nietzsche is famously critical of anthropomorphism. Third, if constructivism were true, then, given the diversity of language users,

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Section: Justin Remhofmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I have argued (Remhof ), along with Nehamas (: Ch. 3), Anderson (), and Cox (: 152–163), that Nietzsche adopts a radical Kantian view of objects called constructivism . This view holds that all objects are socially constructed.…”

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Defending Nietzsche's Constructivism about Objects

Remhof

2017

European J of Philosophy

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“…For the reading that Nietzsche thinks objects are socially constructed, see Nehamas ; Anderson ; Cox ; Remhof . For the reading that objects have intrinsic natures, see Hales and Welshon ; Doyle .…”

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“…For example, prominent works on Nietzsche’s metaphysics, such as Schacht ; Richardson ; Poellner 1996; Cox ; Hales and Welshon ; and Doyle , never investigate Nietzsche’s relation to object monism.…”

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Nietzsche on Monism about Objects

Remhof¹

2018

The Southern J of Philosophy

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This article concerns whether Nietzsche is sympathetic to monism about concrete objects, the heterodox metaphysical view that there is exactly one concrete object. I first dispel prominent reasons for thinking that Nietzsche rejects monism. I then develop the most compelling arguments for monism in Nietzsche’s writings and check for soundness. The arguments seem to be supported by the texts, but they have not been developed in the literature. Despite such arguments, I suggest that Nietzsche is actually not sympathetic to monism about objects—but his reasons for siding against monism are not at all obvious. The result should be a new understanding of some of Nietzsche’s fundamental ontological commitments.

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“…Even from this restricted perspective, the interesting thing about Nietzsche is that he is a particularly tricky case: he has been characterised as a philosopher in the transcendental tradition (Green 2002) and more often as a naturalist and an empiricist (Leiter 2002, Clark 1990& 2001, Richardson 2004, and in more nuanced way, Cox 1999). 1 Prima facie (and perhaps worryingly), there are justifications for both views, in spite of their apparent incompatibility.…”

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Transcendental Aspects, Ontological Commitments and Naturalistic Elements in Nietzsche's Thought

Han-Pile

2009

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Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Interpretation

Cited by 34 publications

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Defending Nietzsche's Constructivism about Objects

Defending Nietzsche's Constructivism about Objects

Nietzsche on Monism about Objects

Transcendental Aspects, Ontological Commitments and Naturalistic Elements in Nietzsche's Thought

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