Defending Nietzsche's Constructivism about Objects

Abstract

Nietzsche appears to adopt a radical Kantian view of objects called constructivism, which holds that the existence of all objects depends essentially on our practices. This essay provides a new reconstruction of Nietzsche's argument for constructivism and responds to five pressing objections to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist that have not been addressed by commentators defending constructivist interpretations of Nietzsche.In the tradition of Kant and post-Kantian philosophy, Nietzsche was attentive to questions concerning the nature of objects. His texts often address questions concerning the existence and non-existence of objects, the relation of objects to human minds, and how different views of objects impact commitments in many areas of philosophy-not just metaphysics but also epistemology, semantics, science, and even ethics. I have argued (Remhof 2015a), along with Nehamas (1985: Ch. 3), Anderson (1998), and Cox (1999: 152-163), that Nietzsche adopts a radical Kantian view of objects called constructivism.1 This view holds that all objects are socially constructed. Specifically, the existence of all objects we can encounter, such as rocks, trees, and planets, depends essentially on the application of concepts to the world relative to our needs, interests, and values. Nietzsche writes that 'A "thing" is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept ' 2 'Thing' is presumably scare-quoted because constructivism is unorthodox. After all, commonsense intuition strongly suggests that many objects are not socially constructed. But I am not concerned with the truth of constructivism here. Rather, my primary aim is to address objections to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist about objects, specifically objections that other constructivist readers have overlooked.The paper unfolds as follows. I first provide a new reconstruction of Nietzsche's argument for constructivism. The bulk of the essay then addresses five problems with reading Nietzsche as a constructivist. Briefly, here are the objections. First, in a famous passage, Nietzsche appears to embrace the eliminativist view that objects do not exist. Second, constructivism appears to involve taking the world to have human features, and Nietzsche is famously critical of anthropomorphism. Third, if constructivism were true, then, given the diversity of language users,

The Explanation of the Curriculum Characteristics of the E-Learning System Based on the Proposed Principles of Constructivist Approach

“…This approach has affected many educational theoreticians. Adopting the fundamental epistemological principles with constructivist psychology, the theoreticians often emphasize on this approach in their curriculums (3). When the constructivist approach is practiced in the educational cycle, the questions of "how would be the main elements of education will be influenced based on the approach?"…”

“…This approach has affected many educational theoreticians. According to the adaptation of fundamental epistemological principles with the constructivist psychology, theoreticians often emphasize on the relativist approach in their curriculum (3).…”

No‐self and compassion: Nietzsche and Buddhism

“…Justin Remhof suggests such a position: “Nietzsche takes modern science to show that at the fundamental level, reality consists in forces, not material bodies. … Boscovich, who anticipates developments in modern particle physics, contends that non‐extended physical force points are the ultimate constituents of matter” (Remhof, 2017, p. 1139). There is arguably insufficient evidence to establish a Nietzschean “emptiness” view, but on such a view, absence of “absolute reality” would also characterize “force points,” or whatever physics comes up with in future.…”