Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle,

doi:10.1093/oseo/instance.00262114

Cited by 350 publications

(408 citation statements)

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“…In addition, the value function advanced by prospect theory may describe a type of happiness known as 'hedonia' that is derived mainly from acquiring material things. The intrinsic gain function describes a different type of happiness, known as 'eudemonia' that is accrued from pursuing and acquiring magnanimous experiences that satisfy psychological needs (Aristotle, 1993;Ryan & Deci, 2001).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When small losses do not loom larger than small gains: Effects of contextual autonomy support and goal contents on behavioural responses to small losses and small gains

Chatzisarantis¹,

Kee²,

Thaung

et al. 2011

British J Social Psychol

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Based on the tenets of self-determination theory, the present studies examined the moderating effects of interpersonal contexts or goal conditions that afforded satisfaction of psychological needs on loss aversion effects. We hypothesized that behavioural responses to small losses would be stronger relative to behavioural responses to small gains under goal conditions or interpersonal contexts that did not support psychological needs. We also expected the effect to be minimized under goal conditions or interpersonal contexts that supported psychological needs. This prediction was supported in Study 1 that induced satisfaction of psychological needs via manipulations of interpersonal context and in Study 2 that instigated satisfaction of psychological needs via manipulations of goal contents. In addition, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that psychological needs reduced the classic loss aversion effect by increasing behavioural and affective responses to gains and not because psychological needs altered affective or behavioural responses to losses. Results of the present studies support the conclusion that contextual autonomy support and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goals proposed by self-determination theory define a boundary condition of the loss aversion hypothesis.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When small losses do not loom larger than small gains: Effects of contextual autonomy support and goal contents on behavioural responses to small losses and small gains

Chatzisarantis¹,

Kee²,

Thaung

et al. 2011

British J Social Psychol

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“…Although shamelessness, that is, not being ashamed to do what is disgraceful, is a bad thing, it does not follow any the more from this that to be ashamed if one behaves disgracefully is a good thing. 26 We need not be misled by Aristotle's talking in terms of actions. Shame is felt for doing actions that are disgraceful, which a virtuous person would not do.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

“How Do I Live in This Strange Place?”

Vice

2010

Journal of Social Philosophy

124

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“…Whereas Aristotle defends one kind of self-love (the sort which leads a man to take the lead in the performance of 'just or temperate or any other kind of virtuous actions', rather than the sort that amounts to doing everything 'from a selfish motive') there is no place in Murdoch's ideal of unselfing for self-love of any sort. 9 Here, there may be a danger of overstating a gap whose scale depends in part upon preferred terminology. Both clearly reject the self-love of acting always out of selfish motives and in spite of her rejection of a terminology of 'self-love' Murdoch is no more hostile than Aristotle to a legitimate concern for the well being of the self.…”

Section: Murdoch's Platonismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exile From Perfection in Iris Murdoch's Philosophical Texts

Milligan

2009

The Heythrop Journal

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Iris Murdoch's philosophical texts set out the egocentric dangers of guilt but still endorse an account of original sin. This might seem like an unstable combination as these two are in tension, but I argue that Murdoch manages to use this tension in a productive manner. The human condition is treated as one of fallenness, in the sense of an exile from perfection. We are aware of moral failure and also aware of the standard by which we fail. Guilt is reined in, however, by the fact that such failure is a matter of commonplace flawed moral vision and not an Augustinian perversity of the will. This reining in of guilt is still accompanied by a recognition of our unbridgeable remoteness from perfection.Iris Murdoch pictures the human condition as one of fallenness. While this enhances her claim to be worthy of attention by those writing from a theological point of view, it also risks exaggerating the darkness of her conception of moral life. What follows will strengthen the former claim (on our attention) while correcting possible unfavorable misconceptions of Murdoch.To be fallen, on familiar accounts, is to face lifelong exile from perfection. This metaphor of exile presupposes not just that we fail when measured against some authoritative standard; it also implies that we are aware of the standard by which the measuring is to take place. For a fallen being, a certain kind of longing is appropriate. It is difficult to see how such a predicament could be anything other than an occasion for despair. Appeals to fallenness, particularly in the guise of original sin, are accordingly made with caution.However, the connection between fallenness and an unconsoling view of humans is not a necessary one. Nor is it the case that a rejection of fallenness automatically generates a warmed-up picture of the human condition. Bede makes it seem that Pelagius and the early critics of original sin promoted a playful, liberated conception of humanity. But defenders of Augustine point out that the abandonment of original sin removes mitigation for fault. Without original sin, our shared human failure to comply with divine/moral ordinance may seem like simple perversity, a uniform lapse that is inexplicable except on the assumption that mankind are a bad lot mired in the circumstances that we deserve.If there is a good case for retaining a concept of fallenness it will involve something like the following: an endorsement of the claim that (1) the concept is necessary or too deeply entrenched in our ways of thinking to be readily removed; and/or an endorsement of the claim that (2) fallenness offers a good way to explain generalised moral failure without appeal to human perversity. These two claims work well together. The danger that (2) guards against presupposes failure of the sort that lends credence to (1). And this may lead us to favour their conjunction in place of a weaker, disjunctive (either/or) approach.

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Nicomachean Ethics

Cited by 350 publications

References 0 publications

When small losses do not loom larger than small gains: Effects of contextual autonomy support and goal contents on behavioural responses to small losses and small gains

When small losses do not loom larger than small gains: Effects of contextual autonomy support and goal contents on behavioural responses to small losses and small gains

“How Do I Live in This Strange Place?”

Exile From Perfection in Iris Murdoch's Philosophical Texts

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