New work for a theory of universals

Lewis, David

doi:10.1080/00048408312341131

Cited by 1,817 publications

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“…The answer, I believe, is yes. But not because we have equally good reason to believe, 47 See, inter alia, Lewis (1983) and Lewis (1994). 48 Lewis (1994, §4) pursues a similar strategy regarding lawhood and chances.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radical Pluralism

Segal

2018

Nous

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Humean Supervenience is the view that (a) there are a plurality of fundamental beings, (b) there are no inexplicable constraints on modal space, and hence the fundamental nature of each such being is independent of those of all the rest and of the fundamental relations in which it stands to the rest, (c) the fundamental beings stand in no fundamental causal or nomic relations, and hence (d) the distribution of any causal or nomic relations in which they do stand globally supervenes on their fundamental natures and the non‐nomic, non‐causal fundamental relations in which they stand. If Humean Supervenience is true, then as A.J. Ayer put it, it's just one damn thing after another. Radical Pluralism is the view that Humean Supervenience is true, and, moreover, that none of the fundamental beings stands in any fundamental relations at all. If Radical Pluralism is true, then, as William James puts it, the world's pieces are held together by nothing more than conjunction: it's just one damn thing and another. I argue that Radical Pluralism is very likely true, conditional upon Humean Supervenience. Any philosopher pluralist enough to be Humean ought to be radically pluralistic.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radical Pluralism

Segal

2018

Nous

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“…), initially excluding at least some possibilia (insofar as physicalism is taken to be a contingent thesis about the actual worldthough see section 2.2.4) and perhaps also mathematical and metaphysical entities. 3 See also Davidson (1970), Lewis (1983), Pettit (1995), Kirk (1996), Armstrong (1997), Melnyk (1997), Ravenscroft (1997), Papineau (2001), Loewer (2001), Witmer (2001). 4 Here I assume that what entities a science treats corresponds roughly to the divisions in subject matter associated with the various fundamental and special sciences (which divisions track, among other things, constitutional complexity).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For no matter how implausible and outlandish it sounds, panpsychism per se is not inconsistent with physicalism (c.f. Lewis 1983). After all, the fact that there are some conscious beings is not contrary to physicalism-why then should the possibility that everything is a conscious being be contrary to physicalism?…”

Section: Stoljar's Argumentmentioning

confidence: 94%

On characterizing the physical

Wilson

2006

Philos Stud

119

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“…1); Panayot Butchvarov (1979, chap. 7); and David Lewis (1983). The relevant nominalist accounts do not make similarity a function of language, and thus they contrast with extreme linguistic nominalism.…”

Section: A Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond the Private Language Argument

Moser

1992

Metaphilosophy

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New work for a theory of universals

Cited by 1,817 publications

References 0 publications

Radical Pluralism

Radical Pluralism

On characterizing the physical

Beyond the Private Language Argument

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