New Results in Related Key Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on Reduced Round AES-192

Jithendra, K.B.; Shahana, T. K.

doi:10.1109/icacct.2018.8529666

Cited by 10 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Furthermore, experimental results from the DC attacks were conferred as evidence of accepting the idea as outlined. Even though the first plan of DC attack was on DES [1,16], however, the extensive applicability of DC attacks to several other cryptographic algorithms thickened the superiority of DC attack techniques in the security inspection of all cryptographic algorithms [1,7,9,22,29]. Cryptologists developed technology based on techniques explicitly targeted at DC circumvention [6,7,9].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Z'aba and Maarof [10] indicated that the superiorities of attacks were grounded in the principle of a DC attack. For instance, the impossible differential attack was utilized on the MixColumns transformation of an AES [10,29]. If a pair of plaintext varied only in one byte, then the reduced four rounds ciphertext of an AES would never be the same in the ciphertext byte positions: (0, 0), (1,3), (2, 2), (3, 1), (0, 1), (1, 0), (2, 3),(3, 2), (0, 2), (1, 1), (2, 0), (3,3) nor (0, 3), (1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 0) [10].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Preventing Differential Cryptanalysis Attacks Using a KDM Function and the 32-Bit Output S-Boxes on AES Algorithm Found on the Internet of Things Devices

Muthavhine

Sumbwanyambe

2022

Cryptography

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Many Internet of Things (IoT) devices use an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm to secure data stored and transmitted during the communication process. The AES algorithm often suffers DC (DC) attacks. Little has been done to prevent DC attacks, particularly on an AES algorithm. This study focuses on preventing Differential Cryptanalysis attacks. DC attacks are practiced on an AES algorithm that is found on IoT devices. The novel approach of using a Khumbelo Difference Muthavine (KDM) function and changing the 8 × 8 S-Boxes to be the 8 × 32 S-Boxes successfully prevents DC attacks on an AES algorithm. A KDM function is a newly mathematically developed function, coined and used purposely in this study. A KDM function was never produced, defined, or utilized before by any researcher except for in this study. A KDM function makes a new 32-Bit S-Box suitable for the new Modified AES algorithm and confuses the attacker since it comprises many mathematical modulo operators. Additionally, these mathematical modulo operators are irreversible. The study managed to prevent the DC attack of a minimum of 70% on AES and a maximum of 100% on a Simplified DES. The attack on the new Modified AES Algorithm is 0% since no S-Box is used as a building block.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preventing Differential Cryptanalysis Attacks Using a KDM Function and the 32-Bit Output S-Boxes on AES Algorithm Found on the Internet of Things Devices

Muthavhine

Sumbwanyambe

2022

Cryptography

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“…We make the point that the major consequence of this exercise is with respect to implementation attacks; and this is precisely the perspective in which we have provisioned a compensation with the secure element as a trade-off in the efficient security algorithm for power constrained IoT devices. While a formal analysis of security protocols is on its own, an whole area of fertile research [31], according to [32], the security of an encryption scheme is usually measured through the application of different types of cryptanalysis methods. The security of the AES algorithm with respect to key length is based on its resistance against breakability by brute-force/exhaustive key search.…”

Section: A Cryptanalytic Overview Of the Consequence Of Aes Round Rementioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient Security Algorithm for Power-Constrained IoT Devices

Mamvong

Goteng

Zhou

et al. 2021

IEEE Internet Things J.

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Internet of Things (IoT) devices characterized by low power and low processing capabilities do not exactly fit into the provision of existing security techniques, due to their constrained nature. Classical security algorithms which are built on complex cryptographic functions often require a level of processing that low power IoT devices are incapable to effectively achieve due to limited power and processing resources. Consequently, the option for constrained IoT devices lies in either developing new security schemes or modifying existing ones to be more suitable for constrained IoT devices. In this work, an Efficient security Algorithm for Constrained IoT devices; based on the Advanced Encryption Standard is proposed. We present a cryptanalytic overview of the consequence of complexity reduction together with a supporting mathematical justification, and provisioned a secure element (ATECC608A) as a trade-off. The ATECC608A doubles for authentication and guarding against implementation attacks on the associated IoT device (ARM Cortex M4 microprocessor) in line with our analysis. The software implementation of the efficient algorithm for constrained IoT devices shows up to 35% reduction in the time it takes to complete the encryption of a single block (16bytes) of plain text, in comparison to the currently used standard AES-128 algorithm, and in comparison to current results in literature at 26.6%

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“…Many articles were published about fault based attacks and side channel attacks on AES [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21]. An improved version of related key impossible differential attack on AES-192 is given in [22]. Now the research on light weight block cipher has become a hot research topic in cryptography.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%