‘New’ Governance in European Union Policy Making: Policy Innovation or Political Compromise in European Telecommunications?

Simpson, Seamus

doi:10.1080/01402382.2011.591108

Cited by 17 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Its own impact assessment warned that an EU regulator might just create “another layer of regulation which would increase the overall administrative burden” (European Commission , p. 21; cf. Simpson , p. 1121). When the Commission, nevertheless, proposed the creation of an EU telecoms agency (“EECMA”) in 2007, the EU Parliament (EP) – not member states – was the first to oppose it.…”

Section: Combining Functional and Political Explanations Of Ernsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks

Blauberger

Rittberger

2014

Regulation & Governance

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European regulatory networks (ERNs) play a central role in the formulation, deliberation, and implementation of EU policies and have, thus, become objects of investigation in a fast-growing scholarly literature. We identify two shortcomings -one conceptual, one theoretical -in the literature on ERNs: First, we argue that the principal-agent approach, which is conventionally used to conceptualize ERNs, overlooks and even misrepresents central features of ERNs. By introducing and applying the "orchestration" framework to ERNs we demonstrate that it better captures the specific characteristics of ERNs. Secondly, explanations for the choice and design of ERNs have treated functional and power-based accounts as mutually exclusive. We argue instead that explanatory leverage can be gained by combining these two accounts by specifying their respective domains of application. While functional accounts enable us to illuminate why and under what circumstances ERNs are created in the first place (rather than EU agencies or delegation to the Commission), political accounts help us to shed light on variation in the design of ERNs (i.e. why actors opt for rather close or loose network structures). We illustrate the explanatory value-added of such an approach through two brief case studies on EU telecommunications and competition policies.

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Section: Combining Functional and Political Explanations Of Ernsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks

Blauberger

Rittberger

2014

Regulation & Governance

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“…Since the solution of centralisation of regulatory powers has often not been politically feasible, one of the most important claims of this literature is that the European regulatory networks should be seen as a soft instrument for achieving a stronger harmonisation of the regulatory activities of the member states (Eberlein/Grande 2005, Blauberger/Rittberger 2015. Therefore the EU Commission is often identified as initiator of such regulatory networks (Coen/Thatcher 2008), sometimes as a direct response to its failure of establishing a European agency due to the resistance of the member states (Simpson 2011 for the case of BEREC). The political science literature also deals with other research questions, as, e.g., the evolution of these European regulatory networks.…”

Section: Regulatory Network As Governance Instruments In the Politicmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An example is document BoR (12) 127, which presents a common position on best practice in remedies in a specific market. Therefore Batura (2012, 15) is right to call the use of soft law by BEREC a successful example of "regulation by information" (see also Simpson 2011Simpson , 1124.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Regulatory Networks, Legal Federalism, and Multi-level Regulatory Systems

Kerber

Wendel

2016

Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractTransnational regulatory networks play important roles in multi-level regulatory regimes, as e.g, the European Union. In this paper we analyze the role of regulatory networks from the perspective of the economic theory of legal federalism. Often sophisticated intermediate institutional solutions between pure centralisation and pure decentralisation can help to solve complex tradeoff problems between the benefits and problems of centralised and decentralised solutions. Drawing upon the insights of the political science literature about regulatory networks, we show that regulatory networks might be an institutional innovation that can fulfill a number of functions (rule-making, best practices and policylearning, effective enforcement, conflict resolution) that might allow for a better intermediate solution between centralised and decentralised regulatory powers. We apply our approach in three case studies to very different regulatory networks, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communication (BEREC), the European Competition Network (ECN), and the International Competition Network (ICN). An important result is that regulatory networks might not only be a temporary phenomenon but part of long-term institutional solutions in European multi-level regulatory regimes.

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“…The EC proposed a formal advisory network whose secretariat would be provided by the EC itself. The Council rejected the entire idea of a formal network of NRAs À formally justifying this on legal arguments, but actually looking to maintain maximum national autonomy regarding the telecoms market (Simpson, 2011).…”

Section: The Grand Dialectic Of Berec's Creationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Development of the Governance of Regulatory Networks: The Case of the European Telecommunications Regulatory Network

Saz-Carranza¹,

Longo²,

Iborra³

2014

Mechanisms, Roles and Consequences of Governance: Emerging Issues

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Purpose of this Paper À Networks are by now popular interorganizational coordination modes. However, there is still much to know regarding how networks are governed and how their governance develops and changes through time.Design/Methodology/Approach À This paper addresses the research question how does the governance form of networks develops over time by empirically studying the European telecommunications regulatory network using a case study approach.Findings À We find that the network's governance system is determined by the dialectical tension between network members (National Regulatory Agencies) and an external very influential body (the European Commission).This tension unifies the group in the classic external conflictÀinternal cohesion fashion. We also identify a second dialectical tension internal to the network among its members. The tensions are triggered by evaluations carried out by an external actor (the European Commission). In general, the process observed confirms the propositions that predict a formalizing of the governance as the network grows older.Research limitations/Implications À This research is based on a single case, a broader analysis of other regulatory networks among network industries at the European Union level will help researchers to establish a more comprehensive picture on the development of the governance form of this specific subset of goal-directed networks.

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‘New’ Governance in European Union Policy Making: Policy Innovation or Political Compromise in European Telecommunications?

Cited by 17 publications

References 18 publications

Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks

Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks

Regulatory Networks, Legal Federalism, and Multi-level Regulatory Systems

The Development of the Governance of Regulatory Networks: The Case of the European Telecommunications Regulatory Network

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