New Estimates of Government Net Capital Stocks for 22 OECD Countries 1960-2001

Kamps, Christophe

doi:10.2139/ssrn.752984

Cited by 119 publications

(199 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Appendix A Construction of data and data sources we use the perpetual inventory method as described in Kamps (2006) Real government net capital stock…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fiscal policy and TFP in the OECD: measuring direct and indirect effects

2014

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“…Appendix A Construction of data and data sources we use the perpetual inventory method as described in Kamps (2006) Real government net capital stock…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To construct real government net capital stocks OECD, Economic Outlook 91, series IGV we use the perpetual inventory method as described in Kamps (2006) Total annual hours worked in the economy …”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal policy and TFP in the OECD: measuring direct and indirect effects

2014

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“…Data on public capital are taken from Kamps (2005). The data covers the period 1960-2001 for 22 OECD countries.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vertical Industrial Policy in the EU: An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of State aid

Gual

Jódar-Rosell²

2006

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may State aid: a key tool of industrial policy in the EUThis paper assesses the effectiveness of vertical industrial policies within the EU. For the purpose of this paper, industrial policy is defined as "the set of government interventions that by way of taxes (or subsidies) and regulations on domestic products or factors of production attempt to modify the allocation of domestic resources that results from the free operation of the market" (Gual 1995, p. 9).To narrow down what otherwise is a very broad definition, we exclude measures directed to primary sectors as well as those related to non-tradable industries, such as housing services or retail trade. Policies that affect most firms in a country to a similar extent -for example, investment tax credits or subsidies for the employment of a particular kind of labour -are also excluded.State aid is part of the toolkit available for governments to implement their preferred industrial policy. This toolkit is somewhat limited for EU countries due to the agreements and legislation directed towards creating a single internal market, including a common policy with respect to trade barriers, mutual recognition of standards, and so on. European laws defining the legality of state aid constitute perhaps the most important element in the agreed framework for implementing industrial policies within Europe.The main economic justification for industrial policy, including state aid, is the quest for efficiency. Thus, government aid aims to correct market failures, such as externalities, asymmetric information, market power, coordination problems, and public goods. The most common example of (positive) externalities is the research and development (R&D) activity of private companies. Asymmetric information, in turn, is used as a justification for granting aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Asymmetric information between a bank and an SME about the latter's potential to repay a loan or about the riskiness of its projects may prevent even a profitable SME to access finance.Market failures such as these justify the general objectives of R&D or SME support. Additional arguments are needed, however, to justify government intervention in specific industries or firms. Optimal use of government resources suggests that intervention should focus on those industries where externalities are particularly important. In the case of R&D, general support to all sectors may be desirabl...

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“…For public adaptation, we take implicit scrapping rates for net government capital stocks in the US as a reference point. Those have been estimated at approximately 4% per year (Kamps, 2006), which implies a δ A of 0.84. This…”

Section: Numerical Illustration and Welfare Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of mitigation and adaptation

Habla

Roeder

2017

European Economic Review

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In this paper, we acknowledge that the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change have differential fiscal impacts. Whereas mitigation typically raises fiscal revenues, adaptation is costly to the taxpayer and to a greater extent the more distortionary the tax system is. In an OLG model with majority voting, we analyze how the choices of mitigation and adaptation are distorted under a lump-sum and a distortionary income tax regime. We find that whenever emissions and adaptation exhibit stock characteristics, the levels of mitigation and adaptation are chosen inefficiently low in the political equilibrium under lump-sum taxation. By contrast, the political equilibrium may entail inefficiently high mitigation or inefficiently high adaptation (but not both simultaneously) if the tax system is distortionary.A calibration of our model to the German economy shows that both mitigation and adaptation can be expected to be inefficiently low in the political equilibrium. Furthermore, the standard assumption of a lump-sum tax system when analyzing mitigation and adaptation is found to underestimate the loss in utilitarian welfare relative to a distortionary tax system, although mitigation levels are generally higher under the latter regime. JEL-Classification: D72, D78, H21, H23, Q58Keywords: Adaptation, Mitigation, Political Economy, Majority Voting, OLG, Environmental Taxes * We thank Kelly de Bruin, Jurate Jaraite-Kazukauski, Thomas Sterner and seminar participants at the University of Umeå for valuable comments and suggestions. Wolfgang Habla acknowledges the generous financial support from the FORMAS research program COMMONS.

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New Estimates of Government Net Capital Stocks for 22 OECD Countries 1960-2001

Cited by 119 publications

References 47 publications

Fiscal policy and TFP in the OECD: measuring direct and indirect effects

Fiscal policy and TFP in the OECD: measuring direct and indirect effects

Vertical Industrial Policy in the EU: An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of State aid

The political economy of mitigation and adaptation

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