New Design of PMU for Real-Time Security Monitoring and Control of Wide Area Intelligent System

Kim, Hak-Man; Jeon, Jin-Hong; Shin, Min Jae; Oh, Tae-Kyoo

doi:10.1007/11893004_103

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…For example, in false data injection attacks against state estimation, the hackers attempt to compromise measurement sensors or break into the routers that relay the measured data towards the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems in order to insert errors into certain state variable estimations [6]. A successful attack can potentially cause grid instability [7]. Some recent algorithms on detecting and preventing cyber-attacks against state estimation are presented in [8], [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributed Internet-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Smart Power Grids

Mohsenian-Rad

Leon-Garcia

2011

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

224

103

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With the increase in use of information technology in advanced demand side management and given the growth in power consumption in the computation and communications sectors, a new class of cyber-intrusion plans is emerging that aims to alter the load through the Internet and by means of automatic and distributed software intruding agents. These attacks work by compromising direct load control command signals, demand side management price signals, or cloud computation load distribution algorithms to affect the load at the most crucial locations in the grid in order to cause circuite overflow or other malfunctions and damage the power system equipments. To gain insights into these less-examined yet important intrusion strategies, in this paper, we identify a variety of practical loads that can be volnurable to Internet-based load altering attacks. In addition, we overview a collection of defence mechanisms that can help in blocking these attacks or minimizing the damage caused by them. Our simulation results based on the standard setting in the IEEE 24bus Reliability Test System show that our proposed cost-efficent load protection strategy can significantly reduce the cost of load protection while it guarantees that no Internet-based load altering attack may overload the power distribution system.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%