NEV’s Supply Chain Coordination with Financial Constraint and Demand Uncertainty

Abstract

Sustainable development coordination can facilitate the new energy vehicles (NEV) supply chain. By a coordinating supply contract, the operating costs can be reduced and supply chain competitiveness can be improved. We designed a revenue-sharing and buy-back (RSBB) contract to coordinate the supply chain with the cash-strapped retailer or manufacturer and analyzed the impact of the acceptable bankruptcy risk and own fund on the optimal order quantity, supply chain profits, and coordinating factors, including revenue share and buy-back price. Interestingly, the revenue share decreases in the acceptable bankruptcy risk, but the buy-back price increases in the acceptable bankruptcy risk when the retailer has financial constraints. However, when the manufacturer has financial constraints, the revenue share increases in the acceptable bankruptcy risk, but the buy-back price decreases in the acceptable bankruptcy risk.

Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges: a multi-leader–follower game approach

“…Yang et al (2021) examined the coordination effect of wholesale price contracts in the presence of members' risk and capital constraints. Li and Li (2022) developed a BBRS contract to eliminate double marginalization in a new energy vehicle supply chain with a cash-strapped retailer.…”

Robust Emission Reduction Strategies under Cap-and-Trade and Demand Uncertainty

“…The prevailing volatility in the business environment is one of the major factors that impact the operations management of manufacturers [16]. Many researchers have discussed manufacturers' operational decision making in consideration of demand uncertainty [13][14][15][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24]. Ramezani et al [17] developed a stochastic multi-objective optimization model to identify Pareto equilibrium under an uncertain environment in which prices, costs, market demands, and return rates are uncertain.…”

“…They concluded that offering incentive mechanisms can effectively induce the retailer to participate in the green technology investment. Li and Li [23] considered the financial constraints and demand uncertainty of sustainable supply chain members and proposed a revenue-sharing (RS) and buy-back (RSBB) contract to coordinate the supply chain. Wu and Shang [24] modeled a green supply chain consisting of a supplier, a government, a leader retailer, and a follower retailer to investigate the greening operational decisions and information leakage decisions under demand uncertainty.…”

“…Although some studies discussed the selection of emission reduction strategies under the cap-and-trade regulation, the role of demand uncertainty is largely ignored [36,38]. Previous studies emphasize the role played by demand uncertainty on various types of operational strategies made by firms [14,15,[19][20][21][22][23]. However, its impacts on emission reduction strategy remains unknown in the extant literature.…”