Neuroscience of Self and Self-Regulation

Abstract

As a social species, humans have a fundamental need to belong that encourages behaviors consistent with being a good group member. Being a good group member requires the capacity for self-regulation, which allows people to alter or inhibit behaviors that would place them at risk for group exclusion. Self-regulation requires four psychological components. First, people need to be aware of their behavior so as to gauge it against societal norms. Second, people need to understand how others are reacting to their behavior so as to predict how others will respond to them. This necessitates a third mechanism, which detects threat, especially in complex social situations. Finally, there needs to be a mechanism for resolving discrepancies between self-knowledge and social expectations or norms, thereby motivating behavior to resolve any conflict that exists. This article reviews recent social neuroscience research on the psychological components that support the human capacity for self-regulation.

Spatial gradient in value representation along the medial prefrontal cortex reflects individual differences in prosociality

“…Although we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the AI/IFG activation may reflect an aversive response to other-regarding choices among selfish individuals, the correlation between AI/IFG activation and the average RTs across individuals suggests that additional cognitive processes may be engaged during the OTHER condition. It is also noteworthy that AI/IFG has been strongly implicated in cognitive control and self-regulation (46)(47)(48)(49). Given that an increase in AI/IFG activity weakened the MPFC-striatum coupling during choices for others, selfish individuals seem to use additional cognitively demanding processes that interrupt the process of prosocial valuation, which may involve signal propagation through the MPFC-striatum loops.…”

Future Directions in Emotion Dysregulation and Youth Psychopathology

“…In contrast to trait anxiety and trait impulsivity, which arise largely from heritable individual differences in activity and reactivity of bottom-up, subcortical brain networks that mature very early in life, emotion regulation is less heritable, considerably socialized (Goldsmith, Pollak, & Davidson, 2008), and subserved by top-down, cortical brain networks that continue to mature into the early 20 s (see Beauchaine & McNulty, 2013;Gogtay et al, 2004;Snyder, in press). Volitional regulation of anxiety occurs through lateral prefrontal inhibition of amygdalar activity and reactivity, whereas volitional regulation of impulsivity occurs through orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal inhibition of striatal activity and reactivity (see Davidson, 2002;Heatherton, 2011;Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). Children and adolescents with anxiety disorders exhibit less functional connectivity in amygdalar-ventrolateral prefrontal connections than controls (e.g., Monk et al, 2008), and adolescents with externalizing disorders exhibit less functional connectivity in striatal-anterior cingulate connections than controls (e.g., Shannon, Sauder, Beauchaine, & Gatzke-Kopp, 2009).…”

Leaving Behind What We are Not: Applying a Systems Thinking Perspective to Present Unlearning as an Enabler for Finding the Best Version of the Self

“…the neurocognitive mechanisms, genes, etc. are being considered (Heatherton 2011;Kelley 2012). Future research could propose a more holistic model for the self and investigate to what extend we can unlearn biological predispositions.…”