Neo-nationalism seeks strength from the gods: Yasukuni Shrine, collective memory and the Japanese press

Abstract

This article examines Japanese press coverage of Premier Koizumi’s controversial visits to Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006. The shrine memorializes war dead, including 14 Class-A Second World War criminals, and is implicated in the history issue — the unresolved legacy of Imperial Japan’s wartime history. Using critical, qualitative content analysis, the authors analyze the Japanese press coverage’s representation of historical context. Theories of the social production of news and collective memory ground their analysis and interpretation of the representations and their implications. They argue that the press coverage that contextualized the shrine’s war criminals offered critical, mnemonic representations, while those that excluded this context provided fragmented representations. The authors assess the implications of these representations for the contemporary political objective of moving Japan toward a martial state. Ultimately, the Japanese press’s capacity to facilitate debate on history issues depends upon the public coming to terms with the war’s history and legacy.

Memory, Nation, and National Commemoration of War Dead: A Study ofJapanese Public Opinion on theYasukuni Controversy

“…In this context, it should be noted that Asahi and Yomiuri , the largest and most influential daily newspapers in Japan that largely represent political liberals ( Asahi ) and conservatives ( Yomiuri ), modified their positions on this issue during PM Koizumi's last years in office. According to Killmeier and Chiba's (, p. 344) study on the major newspaper contents on the Yasukuni issues during the Koizumi tenure (2001–2006), Asahi 's position had been consistently against the official Yasukuni visits, emphasizing the historical role of Yasukuni as a symbol of militarism and Japan's nationalism (cf. Seaton, ).…”

“…Seaton, ). Asahi 's “critical” coverage also incorporated “Chinese and South Korean perspectives” as former victims (Killmeier & Chiba, , p. 344). However, its progressive tones later became “fragmented,” if not entirely changed, in 2004.…”

“…However, its progressive tones later became “fragmented,” if not entirely changed, in 2004. Asahi now questioned: “Why are our traditions criticized by China and South Korea?” (Killmeier & Chiba, , p. 345).…”

“…Asahi also condemned the widely held popular slogan, patriotic innocence ( aikoku muzai ), which allegedly justified the violent actions against the Japanese embassy in Beijing and consulate‐generals in Shanghai and Shenyang ( Asahi Shimbun , ). Asahi now openly questioned the Chinese government's political “motives” behind Vice Premier Wu Yi's abrupt cancellation of a meeting with PM Koizumi ( Asahi Shimbun , ; Killmeier & Chiba, , p. 345).…”

“…Internally, Yasukuni studies tend to focus on the ramifications of the Yasukuni worship on Japan's war memory and/or national identity. Those works underscore, among others, Yasukuni's symbolic power and the Japanese practice of commemorating war dead in prewar (Ohnuki‐Tierney, ) and postwar (Nelson, ) years, contemporary identity politics (Mochizuki, ; Shibuichi, ), Yasukuni's religious aspects (Doak, ), historical narratives around Yasukuni (Breen, ; O'Dwyer, ), and the role of the Japanese media (Killmeier & Chiba, ; Seaton, ). Externally, scholars stressed the international memory wars between Japan and the former victim nations, especially China and South Korea, stirred by PM Koizumi's recurrent Yasukuni visits (cf.…”