“…Similarly, if beliefs are governed by truth, then they must be responsive to evidence, or fail to count as beliefs. As Huddleston (, p. 213) notes, if we draw on the type of argument above, then it follows that: … the following condition, or something akin to it, is necessary for something's being a belief. Truth‐directedness condition It is a necessary feature of any candidate for the status of being a belief that it be responsive to truth and evidence (Huddleston, , p. 213).…”
Section: Unpacking the Criterionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…… the following condition, or something akin to it, is necessary for something's being a belief. Truth‐directedness condition It is a necessary feature of any candidate for the status of being a belief that it be responsive to truth and evidence (Huddleston, , p. 213).…”
Section: Unpacking the Criterionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While there are several related debates, none, to my knowledge, have attempted to do what this article aims to do. Andrew Huddleston, for example, questions whether all beliefs are governed by truth (Huddleston, , pp. 213–214).…”
There is a view in the literature around beliefs that evidence responsiveness is a necessary feature of beliefs. The reasoning is that because beliefs are governed by truth they must be evidence responsive. A mental state that fails to be evidence responsive, therefore, could not be a belief as it could not be governed by truth. The implication is that even those evidence‐resistant mental states that appear to be beliefs are in fact something else. I argue that evidence resistance is a feature of at least some beliefs, so evidence responsiveness cannot be a necessary feature of belief.
“…Similarly, if beliefs are governed by truth, then they must be responsive to evidence, or fail to count as beliefs. As Huddleston (, p. 213) notes, if we draw on the type of argument above, then it follows that: … the following condition, or something akin to it, is necessary for something's being a belief. Truth‐directedness condition It is a necessary feature of any candidate for the status of being a belief that it be responsive to truth and evidence (Huddleston, , p. 213).…”
Section: Unpacking the Criterionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…… the following condition, or something akin to it, is necessary for something's being a belief. Truth‐directedness condition It is a necessary feature of any candidate for the status of being a belief that it be responsive to truth and evidence (Huddleston, , p. 213).…”
Section: Unpacking the Criterionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While there are several related debates, none, to my knowledge, have attempted to do what this article aims to do. Andrew Huddleston, for example, questions whether all beliefs are governed by truth (Huddleston, , pp. 213–214).…”
There is a view in the literature around beliefs that evidence responsiveness is a necessary feature of beliefs. The reasoning is that because beliefs are governed by truth they must be evidence responsive. A mental state that fails to be evidence responsive, therefore, could not be a belief as it could not be governed by truth. The implication is that even those evidence‐resistant mental states that appear to be beliefs are in fact something else. I argue that evidence resistance is a feature of at least some beliefs, so evidence responsiveness cannot be a necessary feature of belief.
“…But now we begin to wonder why we should be so confident that p s is a proposition, rather than merely proposition-like. 16 The less the (alleged) 16 Kent Bach 2011, for example, rejects relativist-invariantism precisely because he thinks that contested sentences do not express propositions. On his view, contested sentences express proposition radicals.…”
“…Versions of what we are calling the "fragmented belief theory" are defended inEgan (2008), Huebner (2009), Gertler (2011), Huddleston (2012,Muller and Bashour (2011) andMandelbaum (2011Mandelbaum ( , 2014. Schwitzgebel (2010) defends a related theory of "in-between" belief.36 In fact, this second belief might only be represented indexically for the batter, along the lines of: I watch the ball this way or that is how I hit the ball.…”
We consider a range of cases-both hypothetical and actual-in which agents apparently know how to ϕ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact ϕ is a way for them to ϕ . These "no-belief" cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to ϕ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to ϕ , then an agent cannot both know how to ϕ and fail to believe that w, the way that she ϕ s, is a way for her to ϕ . We discuss a variety of ways in which Intellectualists might respond to this challenge and argue that, ultimately, this debate converges with another, seemingly distinct debate in contemporary epistemology: how to attribute belief in cases of conflict between an agent's avowals and her behavior. No-belief cases, we argue, reveal how Intellectualism depends on the plausibility of positing something like "implicit beliefs"-which conflict with an agent's avowed beliefs-in many cases of apparent knowledge-how. While there may be good reason to posit implicit beliefs elsewhere, we suggest that there are at least some grounds for thinking that these reasons fail to carry over to no-belief cases, thus applying new pressure to Intellectualism.
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