Natural kinds, psychiatric classification and the history of the <i>DSM</i>

Tsou, Jonathan Y.

doi:10.1177/0957154x16656580

Cited by 33 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 92 publications

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“…Although Tsou considers that certain disorders described in DSM are not natural kinds, he affirms the existence of others that are, such as schizophrenia and depression(Tsou, 2016). His criterion to distinguish disorders that would actually count as natural kinds from those that are not does not depend, as we suggest, on the presence of type B behaviors in the stereotype, but on the possibility of discovering underlying biological mechanisms that account for the stereotype.…”

mentioning

confidence: 82%

“…The two broadly accepted ones are the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) edited by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) approved by the World Health Organization. The descriptive persp ective they assume raises the need to develop new theoretical and etiological approaches in order to validate these diagnostic criteria (Tsou, 2016). 16 New classification proposals that incorporate biomarkers as an objective condition for disorders have become the new scientific challenge for the upcoming DSM and ICD updates (Lord & Jones, 2012); however, there is skepticism regarding this project (Hyman, 2014).…”

Section: Autism Spectrum Disorder: a Study Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is, it is assumed that genetic variables and different brain structures and functions are the causal agents of the "autistic phenotype" , only questioning their labeling as "anomalous" . In short, the discussions are either about which ones are to be considered disorders or not (Happe, 1999;Baron-Cohen, 2017), or which ones are susceptible or not to be categorized as natural kinds (Tsou, 2016). However, the validity of assigning biological essences to psychological categorizations whose stereotype includes type B behavior, whatever they are, interpreting them in terms of phenotype, is not questioned.…”

Section: Searching For "Essences" In the Architecture And Functioningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior

Pérez

Ciccia²

2019

Filosofia Unisinos

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The main thesis of this paper is that a large part of human behavior cannot be understood in terms of natural kinds but by appealing to normative kinds. In the first section we explain the distinction between natural kinds and normative kinds. In the second section we focus on the notion of "human behavior", proposing a distinction between type A and type B behaviors and pointing out that psychology deals with type B behaviors, which are also included as diagnostic criteria for mental disorders. In the third section we analyze the strategies used in biomedical research to find specific etiologies ("essences") in order to explain such disorders. We argue that their results are inconsistent and that the lack of biomarkers that are clinically useful to refine the diagnoses is due to the fact that, unlike certain neuropathologies, there are no physiological essences behind such disorders. On the other hand, we argue that, as we are dealing with type B behaviors, we must interpret mental disorders as normative kinds.

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confidence: 82%

Section: Autism Spectrum Disorder: a Study Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Searching For "Essences" In the Architecture And Functioningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior

Pérez

Ciccia²

2019

Filosofia Unisinos

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“…Despite a lack of available data, Kraepelin made two important claims. First, psychiatric disorders in general, and psychoses in particular, are what philosophers call natural kinds : they reflect the structure of the natural world, being discovered rather than invented 33,34 . He asserted that progress in psychiatric research is possible only if validators converge on natural kinds.…”

Section: Phase 1: Editions 1‐4mentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution of Kraepelin's nosological principles

Heckers

Kendler

2020

World Psychiatry

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Emil Kraepelin developed a new psychiatric nosology in the eight editions of his textbook. Previous papers have explored his construction of particular diagnoses, including dementia praecox and manic‐depressive insanity. Here we are providing a close reading of his introductory textbook chapter, that presents his general principles of nosology. We identify three phases: 1) editions 1‐4, in which he describes nosological principles in search of data; 2) editions 5‐7, in which he declares the mature version of his nosological principles and develops new disease categories; 3) edition 8, in which he qualifies his nosological claims and allows for greater differentiation of psychiatric disorders. We propose that Kraepelin's nosology is grounded in three principles. First, psychiatry, like other sciences, deals with natural phenomena. Second, mental states cannot be reduced to neural states, but science will progress and will, ultimately, reveal how nature creates abnormal mental states and behavior. Third, there is a hierarchy of validators of psychiatric diagnoses, with the careful study of clinical features (signs, symptoms and course) being more important than neuropathologic and etiological studies. These three principles emerged over the course of the eight editions of Kraepelin's textbook and were informed by his own research and by available scientific methods. His scientific views are still relevant today: they have generated and, at the same time, constrained our current psychiatric nosology.

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“…In fact, many philosophers of psychiatry agree that real mental disorders are natural kinds (Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary 2010). For instance, Richard Samuels (2009) argues that delusions, while Jonathan Tsou (2013Tsou ( , 2016 argues that schizophrenia, depression, and even suicide are natural kinds.…”

Section: Natural Kinds In the Biomedical Sciences And Psychiatrymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Kindness of Psychopaths

Brzović

Jurjako

Šustar

2017

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

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Psychopathy attracts considerable interdisciplinary interest. The idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal and clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded. We frame the issue in terms of the question whether 'psychopathy' designates a natural kind according to the cluster approaches. We argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we examine three ways of dealing with the category of psychopathy. We could eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more encompassing account of kinds, which could capture psychopathy as it is currently conceptualised. We argue that while a revision of the category of psychopathy is to be expected with empirical and theoretical advancements, we also emphasise its role in clinical and forensic research, which makes it an important pragmatic kind.

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Natural kinds, psychiatric classification and the history of the DSM

Cited by 33 publications

References 92 publications

Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior

Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior

The evolution of Kraepelin's nosological principles

The Kindness of Psychopaths

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