NATO's Intervention in the Afghan Civil War

Abstract

Afghanistan has provided NATO with its severest test of the post-Cold War period. The Alliance has set the end of 2014 as the target date for a withdrawal from combat operations and the consolidation of an Afghan lead in security provision throughout the country. It is an open question as to what the security situation will be once that crossroad is reached, but observation of progress since 2001 suggests that a lingering military stalemate is likely to persist unless and until a comprehensive political settlement is reached. NATO's ISAF operation has not, itself, had a mandate to affect a political solution, although its multiple efforts clearly impinge upon that goal. Meanwhile, NATO's operational mandate has proven extremely difficult to discharge. The Alliance has demonstrated a degree of flexibility in pursuing its mission, but has encountered a range of insurmountable obstacles -local, national and regional in origin.

Afghanistan’s Neo-Taliban Puzzle

“…Using 4GW approaches to neutralise the Afghan regimes and NATO forces, they adapted Mao’s guerrilla warfare techniques including ‘strategic defensive’ and ‘strategic stalemate’. Indeed, the neo-Taliban’s strategy resembles 4GW (Qazi, 2010; Sperling & Webber, 2012). 4GW fighters ‘seek to use international, transnational, national and sub-national networks for their own purposes’ (Hammes, 2005: 207).…”

“…The Taliban were able to co-opt or marginalise their rivals ‘by promoting defections among their local followers and by deploying their unique knowledge of Pashtun politics to diffuse opposition’ (Sinno, 2008: 76–7). This strategy was also followed by the neo-Taliban, who began infiltrating the Afghan population and gaining influence over it from 2003 onwards (Giustozzi, 2007: 99), starting to approach those villages and towns which they presumed to be hospitable for setting up bases and to establish parallel structures of administration, albeit rudimentary (Sperling & Webber, 2012).…”

“…To what extent sensitivity to local conditions is a robust core element of neo-Taliban strategies remains a part of the puzzle. So far, there is heavy reliance on ‘infiltrating local communities, destroying the vestiges of local administration and intimidating outside influences, such as NGOs’ (Sperling & Webber, 2012: 358). The real test will come when the neo-Taliban assume the mantle of the state and then have to deliver good governance and fulfil local expectations.…”

“…Particularly the public outrage at drone attacks empowers insurgent groups (Abbas, 2014: 202), making the whole operation highly questionable (Connah, 2021: 75). NATO’s military might proved unable to quell the neo-Taliban influence in large swathes of the country (Sperling & Webber, 2012).…”

“…The notable analyst Dennis de Tray (2019: xi) has argued that ‘[a]s of mid-2018, Afghanistan seemed to be a war that will not end—almost a defining characteristic of an insurgency’. Despite numerous efforts by the international community, the security situation remains precarious, the war has worsened, and for many people it now seems endless as well as irresolvable (Lee, 2018; Sperling & Webber, 2012).…”