National Parliaments in the post-Lisbon European Union: Bureaucratization rather than Democratization?

Christiansen, Thomas; Högenauer, Anna‐Lena; Neuhold, Christine

doi:10.1057/cep.2012.38

Cited by 40 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(33 reference statements)

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“…When reformers want to increase the quantity of ex ante scrutiny of EU directives by the Upper House, increasing the number and attendance of (full-time) MPs and their support staff (see Christiansen, Hogenauer, and Neuhold 2013) is unlikely to result in a different selection of EU directives for scrutiny. At most, it will lead to an increase in absolute numbers of committee meetings and plenary debates in Upper Houses in which attention is paid to EU legislative proposals.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Houses of Abstention or Houses of Reflection? Upper Houses in EU Member States and theEx anteScrutiny of EU Legislation

Ruiter

2015

Journal of European Integration

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Scholars interested in the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process hardly paid attention to the differences in scrutiny between Upper Houses of EU member states. It is hypothesized in this article that structural differences between bicameral systems can explain differences between Upper Houses in scrutiny of EU legislative proposals. The hypotheses are assessed with a qualitative content analysis of parliamentary debates in the Dutch and British Upper Houses on the scrutiny of EU directives agreed upon through the ordinary legislative procedure in the period 2000-2010. The empirical findings indicate that differences in the set-up of bicameral systems can only in part explain the variation in ex ante scrutiny. Moreover, in both the British and Dutch bicameral systems, MPs of the Upper and Lower Houses most of the time do not contradict each other on substantive grounds when the same EU legislative acts are scrutinized. The results also show that the scrutiny by Upper Houses improves the output legitimacy of the EU legislative process.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Houses of Abstention or Houses of Reflection? Upper Houses in EU Member States and theEx anteScrutiny of EU Legislation

Ruiter

2015

Journal of European Integration

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“…Recent contributions raise the possibility that national parliaments' adaptation to European integration empowers unelected bureaucrats rather than elected parliamentarians (Christiansen, Hö genauer, and Neuhold 2014). I have suggested that one should examine this potential democratic problem on the basis of a delegation approach.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it has also produced insights that qualify the perception that the member state legislatures are passive losers of integration. This paper examines one of the literature's more sceptical arguments, namely the newly emerging concern over the empowerment of the legislative bureaucracy at the expense of elected deputies in the parliament's engagement with EU affairs (Christiansen, Hö genauer, and Neuhold 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bureaucracy and Democracy: Intra-Parliamentary Delegation in European Union Affairs

Winzen

2014

Journal of European Integration

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Recent literature notes that national parliaments' growing relevance in European Union (EU) affairs might have led to the empowerment of legislative bureaucrats rather than elected politicians, an argument that we may label the "bureaucratisation thesis". This paper suggests that a delegation approach is most suitable for studying the democratic relevance of legislative bureaucracy in EU affairs. From a delegation perspective, however, parliamentary political-administrative relations are likely to work effectively instead of creating democratic deficits. According to this "delegation thesis", parliamentarians are likely to restrict the bureaucratic domain, refrain from delegating exclusive competences, delegate selectively to party group officials and, thus, constrain bureaucratic opportunities to influence policy to positive agenda-shaping. An exploratory analysis of agenda-setting in EU affairs in the German parliament provides tentative support for these arguments.

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“…Fifteen years ago, national parliaments had been treated as the losers or latecomers to the integration process (Maurer and Wessels 2001), but since then they have seemingly progressively developed into important actors, at least on the 'law in the books' level through changes to founding treaties and subsequent formal institutional adaptation (Cygan 2011;Christiansen et al 2014). The research interest followed suit and a plethora of papers has been published inquiring into various aspects of the national parliaments' role in European Union (EU) matters (see thorough overview in Hefftler et al [2015]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing the intensity of scrutiny for ‘domestic’ and implementing bills: does transposition of EU law reduce political contestation in national parliaments?

Zbíral

2016

Journal of European Public Policy

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Research on the role of national parliaments in European Union (EU) matters dominantly concentrates on ex ante scrutiny and mostly neglects that many parliaments are constitutionally obliged to play an important part in the implementation of EU law into domestic legal orders. The low interest is tied to an argument that even if national parliaments are involved in transposition, they only serve as constrained agents of the EU. This article tests this assumption and inquires whether there are differences between parliaments' scrutiny of bills (laws) transposing EU impulses and 'purely domestic' bills. Analysis is based on quantitative data from the Czech Chamber of Deputies and the Slovak National Council. While the project remains essentially exploratory, results suggest that while the implementing bills are debated considerably less than the domestic bills, for the remaining included indicators the intensity of scrutiny for the former group of bills on average does not differ from the latter group. The findings might therefore challenge the thesis that that the implementation process is mere formality that consequently reduces political contestation in the legislatures.

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National Parliaments in the post-Lisbon European Union: Bureaucratization rather than Democratization?

Abstract: Much of the discussion about the provisions on national parliaments in the Lisbon

Cited by 40 publications

References 41 publications

Houses of Abstention or Houses of Reflection? Upper Houses in EU Member States and theEx anteScrutiny of EU Legislation

Houses of Abstention or Houses of Reflection? Upper Houses in EU Member States and theEx anteScrutiny of EU Legislation

Bureaucracy and Democracy: Intra-Parliamentary Delegation in European Union Affairs

Comparing the intensity of scrutiny for ‘domestic’ and implementing bills: does transposition of EU law reduce political contestation in national parliaments?

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