National Parliaments and EU Fiscal Integration

Jančić, Davor

doi:10.1111/eulj.12172

Cited by 23 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Interestingly, however, the very reinforcement of the European reins on national budgets and fiscal policy has provoked an active response among many national parliaments (Fasone 2015;Jančić 2016). Many have used the European Semester to increase their consultation rights in the early stages of budget preparation and on the broader financial and economic frameworks that govern the budgetary process.…”

Section: Sidelining National Parliaments: a Reinforced Two-level Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Against this normative background, the rest of the contribution examines the shifts in economic policy-making power that the new structure of EU economic governance involves and the forms of parliamentary accountability by which these have been matched. Thus, this account offers a holistic view of parliamentary accountability of EU economic governance at both levels, while previous analyses tend to focus on the national (Fasone 2015;Jančić 2016) or the supranational (Fasone 2014) level alone.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

Crum

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

132

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How has the new structure of European Union (EU) economic governance affected the ability of parliaments (national and European) to scrutinize and control economic policy? Departing from the premise that executive power needs to be matched by appropriate parliamentary control, this contribution argues that parliamentary powers have been compromised in EU economic governance. Although budgetary powers remain formally at the national level, governments' decisions have become constrained and national parliaments find themselves on the losing side of a reinforced two-level game. This loss in parliamentary powers is not compensated at the European level, as at that level political authority is effectively left suspended between the national governments, who are unaccountable as a collective, and the European Commission, which lacks a political mandate of its own. Against this background, a final section identifies guidelines for organizing parliamentary accountability in settings, like EU economic governance, in which executive power has come to be shared across levels.

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Section: Sidelining National Parliaments: a Reinforced Two-level Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

Crum

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

132

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…The literature so far has focused on questions related to accountability within the mechanism (Cooper 2017;Crum 2017, Crum andCurtin 2015;Curtin 2014;Cygan, 2017;Dawson 2015;Lord 2017;Scharpf 2012; as well as the adaptation of national parliaments (NPs) to the European Semester (Crum 2017;Fasone 2013;Hallerberg, Marzinotto and Wolff, 2011;Jančić 2016;Kreilinger 2016). However, one aspect of the European Semester, namely the effectiveness of the mechanism, has received significantly less academic attention (Kreilinger 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectiveness of the European Semester: Explaining Domestic Consent and Contestation

Maatsch

2017

Parliamentary Affairs

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MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowledge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). (2014 and 2015) in Austria, France, Germany, and Ireland. While in France and Germany, compliance within the European Semester has been subject to strong politicization, this has not been the case in Austria and Ireland. Moreover, strong politicization coincided with the contestation of country-specific recommendations among the parliamentary parties. The empirical analysis established that strong formal powers in budgetary matters constitute an important prerequisite allowing parliamentary parties to articulate their contestation. However, the willingness to comply depends most directly on whether the content of country-specific recommendations is coherent with the economic preferences of a political party, not the government-opposition cleavage. Keywords

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“…Just as we see an increase in the numbers of women in national parliaments, and in the European Parliament (Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015), economic decision-making is being moved away from parliaments towards finance ministries, centralised executives and central banks (Maatsch , 2015Jančić 2016). These venues, of course, remain male dominated (Walby 2015; Schuberth and Young 2011).…”

Section: A Gendered Expertise Regimementioning

confidence: 99%

Expertise in European Economic Governance: A Feminist Analysis

O’Dwyer¹

2019

JCER

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Recent years have seen a distinctive transformation in EU economic governance, including the introduction of a regime of oversight and recommendation as well as the establishment of new policymaking, oversight and expert institutions at both the European and member state levels. These changes raise questions about legal and political accountability, and about the current state of integration. Debates over the political nature of contemporary economic governance have, thus far, ignored the role that the politics of gender may be playing in constructing and legitimising this regime. While much research has documented the gendered impacts of this regime, there remains a gap in the literature concerning how gender influences the regime itself. This article addresses this gap by exploring two ways in which gender politics have shaped and legitimised the new regime. First, it explores the gendered nature of economic expertise within EU economic governance. Secondly, it explores the framing of the economic crisis, and show how the narratives of the crisis helped to create this gendered regime. The article explores the gendered nature of the process of seeking legitimacy in economic policy, and so the analysis helps to deepen the understanding of the politics behind economic policy more broadly.

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National Parliaments and EU Fiscal Integration

Cited by 23 publications

References 32 publications

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

Effectiveness of the European Semester: Explaining Domestic Consent and Contestation

Expertise in European Economic Governance: A Feminist Analysis

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