Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities

Vives, Xavier

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-t

Cited by 758 publications

(483 citation statements)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

463

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Payoff functions having the supermodularity property and the related property of increasing differences make many games brimming with special properties; see e.g., Topkis (1979), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1990), and Lippman and McCardle (1997) as references.…”

Section: Background Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Capacitated Production Control with Virtual Lateral Transshipments

Yang

Qin

2007

Operations Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the optimal control of a firm with two capacitated manufacturing plants situated in two distinct geographical regions. Demands from each region are mostly satisfied by the local plant. However, if necessary, some of the newly arrived demands can be designated to be served by the other, more remote, plant. The sources of the above virtual lateral transshipments, unlike the ones involved in the real lateral transshipments, do not need to have nonnegative inventory levels throughout the transshipment processes. We develop results about the simultaneous preservation of supermodularity and diagonal dominances of the cost functions and then use these results to derive structural results for the optimal policies. Specifically, to perform optimally, we find that each plant should adopt a modified base-stock policy in observance of its own capacity, while the base level should mildly decrease in the other plant's starting inventory level. Our computational results illustrate the benefits realizable by using transshipment.

show abstract

Section: Background Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Capacitated Production Control with Virtual Lateral Transshipments

Yang

Qin

2007

Operations Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Still the threat is never carried out on the equilibrium path. Kuhn [1994], Maggi [1996], Bulow, Geanakoplos & Klemperer [1985], Vives [1990], and Dastidar [1995], [1997] are prominent examples 3 where such an odd vision of price competition is endorsed. 4 Yet what an economist probably has in mind when introducing quantitative constraints into pricing models is not that firms commit to incur losses on high levels of sales but rather commit not to call for such large sales, precisely because this would entail losses.…”

Section: ) Fi Na L Rema Rksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bertrand competition and Cournot outcomes: further results

Boccard¹,

Wauthy

2000

Economics Letters

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The definition of abstract games belongs to Vives (1990). Under his approach, however, the collection of responses R i was immediately replaced with a single correspondence R : X N → X N , R(x N ) := ∏ i∈N R i (x −i ), to which Tarski's fixed point theorem could be applied.…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%