Bertrand competition and Cournot outcomes: further results

Boccard, Nicolas; Wauthy, Xavier

doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00256-1

Cited by 45 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…While subjects in the high-knowledge treatment receive more extensive instructions and training, also the instructions given in the low-knowledge treatments allow for full information. Boccard and Wauthy (2000;2004) have extended the KS result beyond duopoly; hence our predictions for the triopoly treatments 3 and 4. In triopoly, the Cournot outcome corresponds to a market capacity of 5 = 675 at the first stage, and a market price of = 325 at the second stage; the equilibrium profit per firm is 3 = 50625.…”

Section: Equilibrium Predictionssupporting

confidence: 62%

Number of Firms, Rationing, Matching, and Knowledge: A Comprehensive Study of Variations in Experimental Kreps–Scheinkman Markets

Jacobs

2016

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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Section: Equilibrium Predictionssupporting

confidence: 62%

Number of Firms, Rationing, Matching, and Knowledge: A Comprehensive Study of Variations in Experimental Kreps–Scheinkman Markets

Jacobs

2016

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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“…They produce similar but differential products. The price of their products are 1 P and 2 P . Therefore the products of these two manufacturers can substitute each other but not completely substitute.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, we assume there are no fixed cost for these two manufacturers, and the marginal cost of them are 1 c and 2 c separately. They make their price decision at the same time.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is so called Bertrand paradox. There are four assumptions for Bertrand Model: (1) There are two oligopoly manufacturers in the market, producing homogenous products. The market demand is () Q D P  ; (2) The marginal cost of production is the same for these two manufacturers, and no fixed cost; (3) Manufacturers compete only one time, and make price decision at the same time; (4) There is no other manufacturers entering the market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bertrand Pricing Games under Differentiated Products and Distinct Cost Condition

Wang¹

2014

Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Material Science and Applications

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Abstract. Under differentiated products and distinct cost condition, companies will not price at marginal cost, therefore they can achieve positive profits. Bertrand paradox can be solved to some extent. On the basis of price competition, companies can adopt price cooperation to improve their profit. With equal profit curve, we can observe the differences of increased profits under different cooperative patterns, which can help companies to improve the cooperative patterns and find better cooperative pattern.

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“…2 On the other hand, when uncertainty persists in the price-setting stage, de Frutos and Fabra (2011) illustrated that under certain assumptions the total welfare is equivalent to the Cournot case, yet the capacity levels are asymmetric even when firms are ex-ante identical. Wauthy (2000 and2004) generalized Kreps and Scheinkman's (1983) result to multi-player markets assuming efficient rationing and identical cost functions. Moreover, under similar conditions Loertscher (2008) proved that the equivalence result holds when firms compete in the input and the output market at the same time.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%