Narrative Counterspeech

Abstract

The proliferation of conspiracy theories poses a significant threat to democratic decision-making. To counter this threat, many political theorists advocate countering conspiracy theories with ‘more speech’ (or ‘counterspeech’). Yet conspiracy theories are notoriously resistant to counterspeech. This article aims to conceptualise and defend a novel form of counterspeech – narrative counterspeech – that is singularly well-placed to overcome this resistance. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I argue that conspiracy theories pose a special problem for counterspeech for three interconnected reasons relating to salience, emotion and internal coherence. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology, philosophy of emotion and cognitive science, I then demonstrate that narrative forms of counterspeech constitute an apt response to this diagnosis. Finally, I forestall two objections: the first questions the likely effectiveness of narrative counterspeech; the second insists that, even if it were effective, it would remain unacceptably manipulative. Neither objection, I contend, is ultimately compelling.

Discursive optimism defended

“…This seems wholly consistent with positive counterspeech. Indeed, and as I have discussed elsewhere (Lepoutre, 2022: 8), we can explain why vaccines are safe, and why people have been fed falsehoods, without reiterating those falsehoods. 16 On balance, then, Fraser's appeal to reparative counterspeech doesn’t seem like an objection to positive counterspeech.…”