Na&amp;#x00EF;ve Realism and Illusion

Millar, Boyd

doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.024

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…There are two kinds of illusion: those with a physical cause, and cognitive illusion, which are due to the misapplication of knowledge (Gregory, 1997). Although these two types have extremely different kinds of causes, they can produce some surprisingly similar phenomena such as distortions of length or curvature (Millar, 2015). Illusions due to the illumination, between objects and the eyes, are different from illusions due to sensory signals of the eyes.…”

Section: Illusion: Instances and Causesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A hermeneutic approach to the problem of illusion in sense perception

Odozor¹,

Akintona²

2019

Ujah J. Art Hum

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This paper is a hermeneutic exposition of the problem of illusion in sense perception, using the methods of critical and content analysis as tool of engagement. For decades, post-modern epistemology was steeped in the murky waters of the brilliant, sceptic argument from illusion, according to which the senses could not be relied upon for knowledge of the external world of reality, due to problems believed to be inherent in sensory perception. Why was the argument from illusion so important to epistemologists as to elicit enormous interest for such a long time? What are the implications of the argument for science? Did the argument from illusion portend any real danger for the foundations of empirical knowledge claims, as supposed by many frontline epistemologists? Exploring the concept and science of perceptual illusion, and the implications of the argument from illusion for science and epistemology, the paper found that the argument failed as a refutation of direct realism because it views illusion as the norm rather than an exception, and portrays human knowing process as an automatic, rather than a procedural, gradual phenomenon.

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Section: Illusion: Instances and Causesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A hermeneutic approach to the problem of illusion in sense perception

Odozor¹,

Akintona²

2019

Ujah J. Art Hum

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“…There is no shortage of philosophers who attempt to derive conclusions about the nature of perceptual experience by reflecting upon illusions (some recent examples: Byrne (2009), McLaughlin (2010), Smith (2010), Millar (2015)). But the traditional argument from illusion is very much out of favour.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Invalidity of the Argument From Illusion

French¹,

Walters²

2018

American Philosophical Quarterly

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The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal of critical scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that can be used to make the argument valid. But we argue that the obvious fixes are problematic. If our arguments are successful, we show that the argument from illusion is even more difficult to defend than is commonly acknowledged.

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“…2323Fish argues that illusions must have phenomenal character because the phenomenal character of veridical perception can be partially determined by the phenomenal character of illusory perception—e.g., when an object's shape is perceived accurately but its color is misperceived (2009: 44; see also Smith 2010: 388‐90; Millar 2015: 610‐13).…”

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confidence: 99%

Whither naïve realism? – I

Byrne,

Green

2023

Philosophical Perspectives

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Different authors offer subtly different characterizations of naïve realism. We disentangle the main ones and argue that illusions provide the best proving ground for naïve realism and its main rival, representationalism. According to naïve realism, illusions never involve perceptual error. We assess two leading attempts to explain apparent perceptual error away, from William Fish and Bill Brewer, and conclude that they fail. Another leading attempt is assessed in a companion paper, which also sketches an alternative representational account.

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Naïve Realism and Illusion

Cited by 9 publications

References 9 publications

A hermeneutic approach to the problem of illusion in sense perception

A hermeneutic approach to the problem of illusion in sense perception

The Invalidity of the Argument From Illusion

Whither naïve realism? – I

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