The Invalidity of the Argument From Illusion

Abstract

The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal of critical scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that can be used to make the argument valid. But we argue that the obvious fixes are problematic. If our arguments are successful, we show that the argument from illusion is even more difficult to defend than is commonly acknowledged.

Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science

“…However, this argument represents little progress for the arguer from illusion. Not only is it invalid (French and Walters, 2018), its second premise-the so-called phenomenal principle (Robinson, 1994, p. 32)-is rejected by naïve realists (and by many who are not naïve realists).…”

The Argument from Illusion and the Uniqueness Assumption

“…For the shape you see is the shape of something black, and the tomato is not black. (Smith, 2002, p. 26) 6 Smith refers to this phenomenon as "sense-datum infection". In particular, the colour illusion in question directly influences the subject's awareness of other visual qualities of the tomato such as the shape, size, and so on.…”