Munich’s developer obligations as a legal transplant to the Czech institutional context

Abstract

Well-established developer-obligation models are embedded in many countries. Policy transfers might seem appropriate for adopting such schemes elsewhere. This study brings in-depth insight into the perceptions of key stakeholders on developer obligations from countries with and without such an instrument and demonstrates the barriers hindering policy transfer. We utilise the currently contemplated policy transfer of the Munich model of developer obligations (Germany) into the Czech institutional context as a case study. Our results show that an instrument successful in one institutional arrangement may be perceived as an unattainable dream elsewhere. Surprisingly, developers, instead of hindering the adoption of developer obligations, support them. They praise them for knowing all liabilities in advance, and for being partners for the public sector instead of enemies. On the other hand, differences in institutional context constitute barriers that might result in having an empty legal shell out of the transplant.

Revisiting the Purpose of Land Policy: Efficiency and Equity

“…The costs of social and affordable housing can be partly or fully covered by land rent, if land policies place certain conditions on development on private land. Dutch urban planning defines the location of land for social housing within urban plans (Needham 2016); German cities utilise negotiable developer obligations for conditioning development, such as by a certain percentage of social and affordable housing in newly developed areas (Vejchodská and Hendricks 2022); Spanish regions (Muñoz Gielen, Salas, and Cuadrado 2017) and Swiss municipalities (Debrunner and Hartmann 2020) define a minimum mandatory share of affordable housing to be built in newly developed areas. US municipalities that engage in inclusionary zoning, requiring a certain share of affordable housing, provide certain concessions to landowners in return for these obligations, for instance, non-financial compensation in the form of permitting higher levels of development intensity limits (Lerman 2006).…”

Public Value Capture of Increasing Property Values across Europe

“…The threat of hindering the process by local authorities leads to the willingness of developers to negotiate with them and to give a voluntary financial contribution to municipalities in return for the decrease of the risk of blocking development by them. Mostly, these voluntary contributions amount to € 20-80 per square meter gross floor area (Vejchodská and Hendricks, 2022).…”

“…Recent research indicates that various actors in land development, including municipal authorities and private developers, perceive the current situation in the public infrastructure provision as unsatisfactory. Municipal authorities miss better opportunities for public infrastructure provision, developers feel a lack of a predictable entrepreneurial environment and would welcome some new models of land value capture if they would provide them with a level playing field and a better relationship with the municipalities as well as the public (Vejchodská and Hendricks, 2022). The new law No.…”