Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization

Abstract

We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that alternative voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. This result differs from the one obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using different voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy. Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (

Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes

“…Moreover, this behavior is in line with voters' behavior in relevant papers, which also study elections in which voters are allowed to vote for more than one candidate. In particular, sincerity notions developed in Brams and Fishburn (1978), Dellis and Oak (2006) and Dellis and Oak (2015) are conceptually compatible with (and they are actually stricter than) minimal sincerity, taking into account of course di¤erences in the contexts of analysis.…”

“…Of course, this is not the …rst paper which studies such k-vote rules: Cox (1987), Dellis (2009), Cahan et al (2011) and Dellis and Oak (2015) are just some examples of papers which look at electoral competition when voters are allowed to cast more than one vote. In these papers however, either the set of competing candidates is exogenous and candidates are not win-motivated (it is assumed that candidates payo¤s are smoothly increasing in their vote-shares) or candidacy is endogenous; 9 but the policy platforms of candidates must coincide with their ideal policies (citizen-candidate models).…”

Electoral Rule Disproportionality and Platform Polarization

“…The work by Saporiti () also analyzes electoral competition, but in contrast to ours, it only considers the two‐party scenario and does not provide a general result for the two‐party equilibrium. Herrera, Morelli, and Nunnari () and Herrera, Morelli, and Palfrey () focus on another important aspect of democracies, namely, turnout under alternative electoral rules.…”

“…Myerson (, ) offers pairwise comparisons between PR, approval voting, FPTP, and the Borda rule, focusing on the issues of corruption and campaign promises. A recent series of papers by Dellis and Oak (, ) and Dellis () also focuses on interesting pairwise comparisons.…”

Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization

“…The original citizen candidate models focus on plurality rule and have been extended over several alternative rules and dimensions. Among other, see for exampleHamlin and Hjortlund (2000);Morelli (2004);Levy (2004);Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2013);Dellis (2013);Dellis and Oak (2016). For a review of models where candidacy is endogenous the reader is referred toBol et al (2016).4 This literature is really vast, and fully presenting it is beyond the scope of this paper.…”