Multiple-Purchaser Payments for Ecosystem Services: An Exploration Using Spatial Simulation Modelling

Abstract

This paper focuses on the issue of payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism design when the activity incentivised through the scheme benefits multiple groups, each of whom might be prepared to contribute to payments made through the scheme. In particular, we examine spatial coordination on the demand side of the market; that is to say, the question of which beneficiary of the PES scheme buys land-management changes on which land parcels. We show through spatial simulation modelling that it is possible for negotiation to lead to Pareto improvements when compared to solutions reached through non-cooperative strategic solutions; however, we also show that this result is not universal and only holds under certain conditions. In particular, the spatial correlation and spatial interdependence of the ecosystem service benefits are key in determining whether negotiation between beneficiaries is optimal and therefore if policy makers and designers of PES schemes should be prioritising bringing together multiple beneficiaries of ecosystem services.

Negotiating over payments for wetland ecosystem services

“…21 Finally, in the case with many beneficiaries and many providers, we assume an identical number of providers and beneficiaries and that one beneficiary and one provider can sign only one agreement. As mentioned in section 2.3.1, this latter assumption is in line with the practice of PES, which discourages the possibility of stacking (Salzman 2009, Woodward 2011, Smith et al 2019. With many providers and many beneficiaries, the free-riding issue remains and the intervention of the social planner is necessary to achieve the constrained first-best social optimum.…”

“…In particular, Ferraro (2008) highlights information asymmetries that characterize the contractual relationships between ES beneficiaries and providers. Because of this asymmetric information, PES contracts, defined either as bilateral bargaining or take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contracts, give rise to inefficient outcomes (Crépin 2005, Ferraro 2008, Smith et al 2019, Medema 2020, etc.). To reduce informational rents associated with this asymmetry of information, conservation authorities could also use reverse auctions for PES contracts.…”

“…More often than not, PES programs deter stacking by requiring a proof of additionality from each payment(Salzman 2009, Smith et al 2019). …”

Estimation of the Rational Range of Ecological Compensation to Address Land Degradation in the Poverty Belt around Beijing and Tianjin, China

“…This study estimated the ecosystem service value of the study area from 1980 to 2015 using the equivalent factor method at a 1 km grid scale, and thereafter summarized it on the small watershed scale, since there is generally a homogeneous internal ecological environment in a small watershed [29,30]. First, this study classified the local ecosystems into five types (Table 1), and determined the main ecosystem service types according to previous research [1,26] and the specific situation of the study area.…”

Pagamento por serviços ambientais para catadores de materiais recicláveis

“…Bullock et al (2011) and add that it is necessary to develop local and regional institutional structures to address the complexity of PES systems Fauzi & Anna, 2013;Fernandes & Botelho, 2016;Hanley & White, 2014;Legrand et al, 2013;Van Hecken et al, 2012;Vatn, 2010;Wang et al, 2017), as well as to bear the costs of restauration and to mediate possible conflicts of interest (Banerjee et al, 2017;Pascual et al, 2010;Vatn, 2015). and understand that adaptative management of PES systems is an important strategy in the application of policies in complex intervention contexts, capable of correcting possible design flaws during system implementation Smith et al, 2019;Van Hecken et al, 2012;. Houdet et al (2012) point that many organizations and public policies must consider ecological principles in the adoption of technologies, raw materials, products, and energy sources (Prager et al, 2016).…”