Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Abstract:Multiple banking is a common characteristic of the corporate lending, particularly of midsized and large firms. However, if the firms are facing distress, multiple lenders may have serious coordination problems, as has been argued in the theoretical literature. In this paper we analyze the problems of multiple banking in borrower distress empirically. We rely on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on bank pools, a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in distress. We find that the existence of small pools increases the probability of workout success and that bargaining costs are positively related to pool size. We identify major determinants of pool formation, in particular the number of banks, the distribution of lending among banks, and the severity of the distress.JEL Classification: D74, G21, G33, G34

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