Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design

Thompson, Alexander; Verdier, Daniel

doi:10.1111/isqu.12100

Cited by 38 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 65 publications

(64 reference statements)

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“…Second, the theoretical literature on regional cooperation argues that bilateral deals are more flexible and efficient when the differences between participants are substantial (Saggi and Yildiz 2011;Thompson and Verdier 2014;Yilmazkuday and Yilmazkuday 2014). That is clearly the case for post-Soviet integration, where Russia dominates its counterparts and all the members have different economic, political, and security priorities.…”

Section: Russia's Incentives For Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperatimentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation

Бусыгина

Филиппов

2020

Problems of Post-Communism

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The Russian leadership promotes a vision of a multipolar world where major powers must have their own "zones of influence." This implies that other "great powers" have to recognize Moscow's sphere of dominance over the post-Soviet realm. It also makes Russia's neighbors increasingly reluctant to delegate their sovereignty to institutions of regional integration, as those are likely to become instruments of Russian domination. As the partners do not trust Russia, they insist on a limited character of integration projects. Russia is more likely to be successful in using asymmetric bilateral bargains rather than multilateral institutions to dominate the post-Soviet region.

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Section: Russia's Incentives For Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperatimentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation

Бусыгина

Филиппов

2020

Problems of Post-Communism

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“…However, the more interesting set of cases, and those likely to be of growing frequency under conditions of a global power shift, are policy issues with global externalities that concern the provision of global collective goods for which unilateral or bilateral action on their own would be insufficient (Hooghe et al, 2019). These are collective goods that require cooperation from others – because they require, for example, compliance or specific assets from others – and for which multilateralism can reduce transaction costs of organizing that cooperation and can mitigate distribution and enforcement concerns (Rixen and Rohlfing, 2007; Thompson and Verdier, 2013). This set of cases is of great significance because as the US’ relative power declines under conditions of global interdependence, unilateral provision of collective goods should become more costly and the gains to cooperation should increase.…”

Section: Global Power Shifts and The Hegemon’s Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

US Strategies of Institutional Adaptation in the Face of Hegemonic Decline

Viola

2020

Global Policy

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How do shifts in the global distribution of power affect the US' preferences for institutionalized cooperation? This article explains why and when the power shift creates incentives for the US to move cooperation out of universal multilateral institutions, such as the WTO, and into exclusive multilateral institutions where it seeks to create a leading consensus among a select group of 'like-minded' states. An agreement reached within the subgroup imposes costs on those excluded from the deal. This increases the hegemon's power bargaining leverage visa -vis outsiders who can join the new agreement as pricetakers. In this scenario, the hegemon's institutional response to the challenge of rising powers is a strategy of divide and conquer; that is, strategic cooptation based on inducements followed by power bargaining based on coercion. The double move, however, puts the hegemon in the position of challenging the institutional status quo with potentially negative consequences for the original institutional order. A case study of negotiations over a new trade in services agreement (TiSA) shows this strategy of divide and conquer at work as the US tries to first achieve a deal without emerging economies, notably China, that can later be imposed on them. Policy Implications • US global partners should recognize that the US' commitment to inclusive multilateral institutions is likely to decline because of broader shifts in the distribution of power which increase the domestic and international costs of its commitments, and not merely for reasons idiosyncratic to a given administration.

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“…Geoff R. Berridge's conception of bilateralism covers the process when two international actors negotiate and cooperate while pursuing their national interests (Berridge 1995). Alexander Thompson conceives bilateralism as the interaction of independent states on issues pertaining to the welfare of their people and countries that might be sociocultural, political or economic (Thompson 2014). The spirit and letter of bilateralism often make states to recognize each other and result in the exchange of diplomatic missions to strengthen the relations.…”

Section: Mgimo Review Of International Relations • 13(3) • 2020mentioning

confidence: 99%

Production of Rice in Nigeria: The Role of Indian-Nigerian Bilateral Cooperation in Food Security

Lucky

2020

Vestnik MGIMO-universiteta

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The article focuses on the impact of India-Nigeria agricultural cooperation on rice production in Nigeria. Since 2000 in the quest for food sufficiency, diversification of the country’s sources of foreign exchange, increasing employment for the rising population as well as expanding its external relations Nigeria has signed several bilateral agreements on agriculture with India. The analysis of the developments in the sub-sector, as well as media, governmental and non-governmental reports in the field and the interviews of the farmers has revealed that the Indian firms, including “Olam Group” and “Popular Farms and Mills Ltd”, have cultivated thousands of hectares of land, built mills and machinery, provided farmers in 16 Nigerian states with better rice seedlings, and engaged thousands of farmers in regular training improving employment and revitalizing communities in the country. The support given by the Indian firms has triggered an unprecedented increase in rice production. The paper concludes that the agreements, particularly the one of 2017, have further promoted, strengthened and expanded rice production in the context of food security, job creation and saving foreign exchange. The article, therefore, demonstrates how Nigeria-India bilateral ties and cooperative programs have changed the dynamics of rice production in the country and brought more profound economic consequences. Despite the fact that Nigeria is not yet selfsufficient in rice production with the gap of around 2.5 million tonnes, the agricultural programs initiated within the framework of the Nigeria-India bilateral agreements and realized as large-scale agriculture programmes including investments, training, supply of better seedlings, land cultivation promoted by powerful corporations have significantly changed the economic and social environment in Nigeria.

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Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design

Cited by 38 publications

References 65 publications

Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation

Russia, Post-Soviet Integration, and the EAEU: The Balance between Domination and Cooperation

US Strategies of Institutional Adaptation in the Face of Hegemonic Decline

Production of Rice in Nigeria: The Role of Indian-Nigerian Bilateral Cooperation in Food Security

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