Multi-sided platforms

Hagiu, Andrei; Wright, Julian

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.003

Cited by 709 publications

(481 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Platform functionality can be extended by third parties and are subject to network effects (Eisenmann et al 2011;Evans et al 2006;Van Alstyne 2000a, b, 2005). Further, platforms are building blocks serving as a foundation for constructing complementary products and services Cusumano 2002, 2008;Gawer and Henderson 2007), or as systems for matching buyers and suppliers who transact with each other using system resources (Hagiu and Wright 2015) or sales channels (Ceccagnoli et al 2012). Tee and Woodard (2013) describe the effect of cross layer interactions on platform governance.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control

2018

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Abstract. Suppose that a firm in charge of a business ecosystem is a firm in charge of a microeconomy. To achieve the highest growth rate, how open should that economy be? To encourage third-party developers, how long should their intellectual property interests last? We develop a sequential innovation model that addresses the trade-offs inherent in these two decisions: (i) Closing the platform increases the sponsor's ability to charge for access, while opening the platform increases developer ability to build upon it. (ii) The longer third-party developers retain rights to their innovations, the higher the royalties they and the sponsor earn, but the sooner those developers' rights expire, the sooner their innovations become a public good upon which other developers can build. Our model allows us to characterize the optimal levels of openness and of intellectual property (IP) duration in a platform ecosystem. We use standard Cobb-Douglas production technologies to derive our results. These findings can inform innovation strategy, choice of organizational form, IP noncompete decisions, and regulation policy.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control

2018

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“…Platform technologies such as Apple's iPhone, Microsoft's Xbox, or SAP Netweaver are increasingly common as the infrastructure for transactions between producers, like providers of complements, and consumers (Hagiu and Wright 2015, Parker and Van Alstyne 2005, Rochet and Tirole, 2006. While consumers mostly tend to prefer one platform, 1 complement providers increasingly "multihome"-that is, they develop products for multiple platforms, aiming to reach as many potential consumers as possible (Bresnahan et al2015, Corts andLederman 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Platform Architecture and Quality Trade-offs of Multihoming Complements

Cennamo

Özalp

Kretschmer

2018

Information Systems Research

188

142

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Multihoming -the decision to design a complement to operate on multiple platforms -is becoming increasingly common in many platform markets. Perceived wisdom suggests that multihoming is beneficial for complement providers as they expand their market reach, but it reduces differentiation among competing platforms as the same complements become available on different platforms. We argue that complement providers face tradeoffs when designing their products for multiple platform architectures -they must decide how far to specialize the complement to each platform technological specifications. Because of these tradeoffs, multihoming complements can have different quality performance across platforms. In a study of the US video game industry, we find that multihoming games have lower quality performance on a technologically more complex console than on a less complex one. Also, games designed for and released on a focal platform have lower quality performance on platforms they are subsequently multihomed to. However, games that are released on the complex platform with a delay suffer a smaller drop in quality on complex platforms. This has important implications for platform competition, and for managers considering expanding their reach through multihoming. The logic is that multihoming offers potential additional revenues at limited costs for complementors, implicitly assuming that complements are the same on different platforms. But many platforms are not simple (two-sided) markets enabling transactions; they are also technology infrastructures whose features shape the development of third-party complementary products (Anderson et al. 2014;Gawer 2014, Tiwana et al.2010, Yoo et al. 2010. 2 Complements frequently must be tailored to a platform's core technological functions and interface specifications to take full advantage of its performance (Anderson et al. 2014, Claussen et al. 2015b, Tiwana 2015. In developing for multiple platforms, complementors must decide how far to specialize the complement to one platform (Schilling, 2000, Tiwana 2015, Yoo et al. 2010. We ask how the tradeoffs complementors face when designing products for multiple platforms affect the quality performance of multihoming complements across platforms. , Tiwana et al. 2010, Gawer 2014. As a system comprises the platform and its complements, the effect of platform architecture on both platform performance and complement supply matters for value creation at the system level (Cennamo 2016). the core technology components (e.g., processor cores), and the larger the number of specialized processors requiring a specific programming language for optimal utilization (i.e., no clean interface to handle the interdependencies), the more complex the platform. Complement developers must therefore choose to either use that language to optimally "conform" (Tiwana 2015) to the complex platform's specifications at the expense of integration and performance on other platforms, or to design the complement so it uses the lowest common denominator acr...

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“…Contrary to a one-sided market (where suppliers and customers are independent from each other), multi-sided markets link two or more distinct but interdependent groups of stakeholders. These are proliferating today as modern information technology creates more opportunities for organising complex markets and business platforms [38,39]. As business models are constructed by integrating interaction patterns and value chains [40], the value chain developed by the BMI-TF and described in Fig.…”

Section: Ehr4cr Multi-stakeholder Value Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Business analysis for a sustainable, multi-stakeholder ecosystem for leveraging the Electronic Health Records for Clinical Research (EHR4CR) platform in Europe

Dupont¹,

Béresniak²,

Sundgren

et al. 2017

International Journal of Medical Informatics

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IntroductionThe Electronic Health Records for Clinical Research (EHR4CR) technological platform has been developed to enable the trustworthy reuse of hospital electronic health records data for clinical research. The EHR4CR platform can enhance and speed up clinical research scenarios: protocol feasibility assessment, patient identification for recruitment in clinical trials, and clinical data exchange, including for reporting serious adverse events. Our objective was to seed a multi-stakeholder ecosystem to enable the scalable exploitation of the EHR4CR platform in Europe, and to assess its economic sustainability. Materials and methodsMarket analyses were conducted by a multidisciplinary task force to define an EHR4CR emerging ecosystem and multi-stakeholder value chain. This involved mapping stakeholder groups and defining their unmet needs, incentives, potential barriers for adopting innovative solutions, roles and interdependencies. A comprehensive business model, value propositions, and sustainability strategies were developed accordingly.Using simulation modelling (including Monte Carlo simulations) and a 5-year horizon, the potential financial outcomes of the business model were forecasted from the perspective of an EHR4CR service provider. ResultsA business ecosystem was defined to leverage the EHR4CR multi-stakeholder value chain. Value propositions were developed describing the expected benefits of EHR4CR solutions for all stakeholders. From an EHR4CR service provider's viewpoint, the 3 business model simulation estimated that a profitability ratio of up to 1.8 could be achieved at year 1, with potential for growth in subsequent years depending on projected market uptake. ConclusionsBy enhancing and speeding up existing processes, EHR4CR solutions promise to transform the clinical research landscape. The ecosystem defined provides the organisational framework for optimising the value and benefits for all stakeholders involved, in a sustainable manner. Our study suggests that the exploitation of EHR4CR solutions appears profitable and sustainable in Europe, with a growth potential depending on the rates of market and hospital adoption.

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Multi-sided platforms

Cited by 709 publications

References 16 publications

Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control

Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control

Platform Architecture and Quality Trade-offs of Multihoming Complements

Business analysis for a sustainable, multi-stakeholder ecosystem for leveraging the Electronic Health Records for Clinical Research (EHR4CR) platform in Europe

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