Research Summary: The recent surge of interest in “ecosystems” in strategy research and practice has mainly focused on what ecosystems are and how they operate. We complement this literature by considering when and why ecosystems emerge, and what makes them distinct from other governance forms. We argue that modularity enables ecosystem emergence as it allows a set of distinct yet interdependent organizations to coordinate without full hierarchical fiat. We show how ecosystems address multilateral dependences based on various types of complementarities—supermodular or unique, unidirectional or bidirectional—which determine the ecosystem's value‐add. We argue that at the core of ecosystems lie nongeneric complementarities, and the creation of sets of roles that face similar rules. We conclude with implications for mainstream strategy and suggestions for future research. Managerial Summary: We consider what makes ecosystems different from other business constellations, including markets, alliances, or hierarchically managed supply chains. Ecosystems, we posit, are interacting organizations, enabled by modularity, not hierarchically managed, bound together by the nonredeployability of their collective investment elsewhere. Ecosystems add value as they allow managers to coordinate their multilateral dependence through sets of roles that face similar rules, thus obviating the need to enter into customized contractual agreements with each partner. We explain how different types of complementarities (unique or supermodular, generic or specific, uni‐ or bi‐directional) shape ecosystems and offer a “theory of ecosystems” that can explain what they are, when they emerge, and why alignment occurs. Finally, we outline the critical factors affecting ecosystem emergence, evolution, and success—or failure.

Research Summary: The recent surge of interest in "ecosystems" in strategy research and practice has mainly focused on what ecosystems are and how they operate. We complement this literature by considering when and why ecosystems emerge, and what makes them distinct from other governance forms. We argue that modularity enables ecosystem emergence as it allows a set of distinct yet interdependent organizations to coordinate without full hierarchical fiat. We show how ecosystems address multilateral dependences based on various types of complementarities-supermodular or unique, unidirectional or bidirectional-which determine the ecosystem's value-add. We argue that at the core of ecosystems lie nongeneric complementarities, and the creation of sets of roles that face similar rules. We conclude with implications for mainstream strategy and suggestions for future research. Managerial Summary: We consider what makes ecosystems different from other business constellations, including markets, alliances, or hierarchically managed supply chains. Ecosystems, we posit, are interacting organizations, enabled by modularity, not hierarchically managed, bound together by the nonredeployability of their collective investment elsewhere. Ecosystems add value as they allow managers to coordinate their multilateral dependence through sets of roles that face similar rules, thus obviating the need to enter into customized contractual agreements with each partner. We explain how different types of complementarities (unique or supermodular, generic or specific, uni-or bi-directional) shape ecosystems and offer a "theory of ecosystems" that can explain what they are, when they emerge, and why alignment occurs. Finally, we outline the critical factors affecting ecosystem emergence, evolution, and success-or failure.

While family business research has prominently recognized that family firms are motivated by nonfinancial factors, the literature has remained relatively silent about whether or not these firms are more likely than others to engage actively with their stakeholders, who often have nonpecuniary demands. This paper argues that family firms are more prone to adopt proactive stakeholder engagement (PSE) activities because by doing so they preserve and enhance their socioemotional wealth (SEW). We explore the impact of the different dimensions of SEW on PSE and identify distinctive logics that explain the adoption of such practices. Finally, we offer a set of topics for future studies.

Because the literature on platform competition emphasizes the role of network effects, it prescribes rapidly expanding a network of platform users and complementary applications to capture entire markets. We challenge the unconditional logic of a winner‐take‐all (WTA) approach by empirically analyzing the dominant strategies used to build and position platform systems in the U.S. video game industry. We show that when platform firms pursue two popular WTA strategies concurrently and with equal intensity (growing the number and variety of applications while also securing a larger fraction of those applications with exclusivity agreements), it diminishes the benefits of each strategy to the point that it lowers platform performance. We also show that a differentiation strategy based on distinctive positioning improves a platform's performance only when a platform system is highly distinctive relative to its rivals. Our results suggest that platform competition is shaped by important strategic trade‐offs and that the WTA approach will not be universally successful. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.