Motivation of Politicians and Long-Term Policies

Müller, Markus

doi:10.2139/ssrn.918180

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…There is also a literature on officemotivated politicians, so called populists, who pander to the public by pursuing short-term policies to maximize reelection chances. The concern of this literature is how to give incentives to implement projects that are beneficial in the long term but come at costs in the short term [see, e.g., Müller (2007); Gersbach (2004)].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Enforcement of Intellectual Property, North–south Trade, and Growth

Schäfer

Schneider

2014

Macroecon. Dynam.

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Now that most countries have harmonized intellectual property right (IPR) legislation as a consequence of signing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the dispute about the optimal level of IPR protection has shifted toward IPR enforcement. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) the regions' incentives to enforce IPRs in a decentralized game, (b) the desired IPR enforcement of the two regions in negotiation rounds on global harmonization, and (c) the constrained efficient enforcement level. We show how the different solutions relate to each other and how the results depend on the research productivity in the North and the regions' relative market sizes. Although growth rates increase substantially when IPR enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endogenous Enforcement of Intellectual Property, North–south Trade, and Growth

Schäfer

Schneider

2014

Macroecon. Dynam.

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“…A perspective which seems to be at odds with the focus on efficiency and parsimony promoted by New Public Management-inspired definitions of "good management". Moreover, public choice theorists have argued that competitive democratic systems with a dominant attention for economizing and efficiency are not well suited to deal with intertemporal dilemmas, because politicians will not be motivated to implement policies that result in short-term costs and long-deferred benefits (Müller 2007;Rapeli et al 2021). The inherent unpredictability of environmental jolts is thus expected to have a negative impact on politicians' willingness to invest in building organizational adaptive capacity.…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%