Mostly Harmless Econometrics

Angrist, Joshua D.; Pischke, Jörn‐Steffen

doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j72

Cited by 4,496 publications

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“…The problem, as is well known, is very difficult to fully resolve. We thereby use propensity score methods to partially resolve such selection effects (Angrist and Pischke 2009;Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 10…”

Section: Endogenous Fraud: a Propensity Score Matching Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

Conyon

2014

J Bus Ethics

157

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This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms.

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Section: Endogenous Fraud: a Propensity Score Matching Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

Conyon

2014

J Bus Ethics

157

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“…The usefulness of the LIML being approximately median-unbiased comes at the price of its imprecision, which can many times render its results uninformative. 17 Notwithstanding LIML's drawbacks, in the words of Angrist and Pischke (2009), if the 2SLS and LIML estimates come out similar, "be happy. If not, worry.…”

Section: Least-squares and Two-stage Least Squares Results And Infermentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Their first suggestion is to throw in the best instrument at hand (in our case oil prices), and to run just-identified IV regressions. Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that the bias in 2SLS is increasing in the number of instruments, so the just-identified setting would provide a least-biased case, all other things equal. The authors show through Monte Carlo simulations that even with weak instruments, just-identified 2SLS is "approximately centered where it should be."…”

Section: Least-squares and Two-stage Least Squares Results And Infermentioning

confidence: 97%

“…We here follow the prescriptions outlined by Angrist and Pischke (2009) to deal with the issue of weak instruments. Their first suggestion is to throw in the best instrument at hand (in our case oil prices), and to run just-identified IV regressions.…”

Section: Least-squares and Two-stage Least Squares Results And Infermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors show through Monte Carlo simulations that even with weak instruments, just-identified 2SLS is "approximately centered where it should be." In addition, Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest making use of the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator. LIML is useful because it has the same asymptotic distribution as 2SLS, yet provides a finite-sample reduction in bias.…”

Section: Least-squares and Two-stage Least Squares Results And Infermentioning

confidence: 99%

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State-Building in Resource-Rich Economies

Jensen

2011

Atl Econ J

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Association of Patient Outcomes With Bundled Payments Among Hospitalized Patients Attributed to Accountable Care Organizations

et al. 2021

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IMPORTANCEIt is unknown how outcomes are affected when patients receive care under bundled payment and accountable care organization (ACO) programs simultaneously. OBJECTIVE To evaluate whether outcomes in the Medicare Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) program differed depending on whether patients were attributed to ACOs in the Medicare Shared Savings Program. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This cohort study was conducted using Medicare claims data from January 1, 2011, to September 30, 2016, and difference-in-differences analysis to compare episode outcomes for patients admitted to BPCI vs non-BPCI hospitals. Outcomes were stratified for patients who were and were not attributed to an ACO. Participants included Medicare fee-forservice beneficiaries receiving care for medical and surgical episodes at US hospitals. Data were analyzed between October 1, 2018, and June 10, 2021. EXPOSURES Hospitalization for any of the 48 episodes (24 medical, 24 surgical) included in the BPCI at US hospitals participating in the BPCI for those episodes. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was change in 90-day postdischarge institutional spending, and secondary outcomes included changes in quality and utilization. RESULTS A total of 7 108 146 beneficiaries (mean [SD] age, 76.9 [12.2] years; 4 101 081 women [58%]) received care for medical episodes, and 3 675 962 beneficiaries (mean [SD] age, 74.8 [10.1] years; 2 074 921 women [56%]) received care for surgical episodes. Compared with patients whowere not attributed to ACOs, the association between bundled payments and changes in postdischarge institutional spending was larger among patients attributed to ACOs

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Mostly Harmless Econometrics

Cited by 4,496 publications

References 0 publications

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

State-Building in Resource-Rich Economies

Association of Patient Outcomes With Bundled Payments Among Hospitalized Patients Attributed to Accountable Care Organizations

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