More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers

Kuntz, Philipp; Thompson, Mark R.

doi:10.5129/001041509x12911362972151

Cited by 99 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In this model, the election fraud variable is positive and significant (p < .01). While this article did not develop expectations for the direct effect of election fraud on post-election violence, it is consistent with earlier research indicating that manipulation increases the potential for revolutionary pressures (Kuntz & Thompson, 2009). The variable measuring the presence of international electoral missions is positive but fails to reach conventional significance levels.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 77%

The cost of exposing cheating

Daxecker

2012

Journal of Peace Research

140

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article investigates the relationship between international election observation, election fraud, and post-election violence. While international electoral missions could in principle mitigate the potential for violence by deterring election fraud, the ability of international observers to detect manipulation may in fact induce violent uprisings. Serious irregularities documented by international observers provide credible information on election quality, which draws attention to election outcomes and alleviates coordination problems faced by opposition parties and society. When elections are manipulated to deny citizens an opportunity for peaceful contestation and international observers publicize such manipulation, violent interactions between incumbents, opposition parties, and citizens can ensue. Consequently, the author expects that fraudulent elections monitored by international organizations will have an increased potential for subsequent violence. This expectation is evaluated empirically in an analysis of postelection conflict events for African elections in the 1997-2009 period. Using original data on electoral manipulation and reputable international election observation missions, findings show that the presence of election fraud and international observers increases the likelihood of post-election violence. Matching methods are employed to account for the possibility that international observers' decisions to monitor elections are endogenous to the occurrence of violence in the electoral process. Results for matched samples confirm the findings in the unmatched sample. A variety of robustness tests show that the results are not influenced by the operationalization of independent variables and influential observations.

show abstract

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 77%

The cost of exposing cheating

Daxecker

2012

Journal of Peace Research

140

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We will do so, first, by identifying two models that citizens in authoritarian regimes have used to demand that their authoritarian leaders exit from power. The first uses protests in the streets to challenge authoritarian incumbents, and the second uses elections to accomplish the same objective-though this distinction has in fact been blurred in some instances when citizens followed up the elections with protests because the regime refused to admit defeat (Kuntz and Thompson, 2009;Tucker, 2007;Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). We then specify several factors that seem to encourage both kinds of popular challenges to authoritarian rulers and explain why, given these common origins, one approach is selected over the other one as the arena for confrontation with authoritarian rulers.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Putin, Popular Protests, and Political Trajectories in Russia: A Comparative Perspective

Koesel¹,

Bunce

2012

Post-Soviet Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

During December 2011, large-scale, anti-regime protests erupted across Russia. What do the Russian uprisings reveal about popular challenges to authoritarian rule and the political trajectory of contemporary Russian authoritarianism? This study identifies two models of citizen mobilization against authoritarian leaders, one focusing on street-based protests and the other using elections as the key arena for launching popular challenges. Three factors encouraging both models are analyzed: declining public support for the regime; growing evidence that leaders are no longer invincible; and changing political opportunities for the opposition. The extent to which these conditions are present in Russia and what this ledger suggests about plausible political trajectories there are evaluated.

show abstract

“…In recent history, we can find many examples for the important role of citizens in moving from de-jure to de-facto accountability. BStolen^elections have triggered mass protests leading up to the color revolutions (Bunce and Wolchik 2010;Thompson and Kuntz 2009). In 2010, Nigerians took to the streets demanding free and fair elections and the replacement of the head of the Election Management Body (EMB) (Le Van and Ukata 2012).…”

Section: The Cost Of Suppressing the Demand For Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Accountability is one of the cornerstones of good governance. Establishing accountable governments is a top priority on the international development agenda. Yet, scholars and democracy practitioners know little about how accountability mechanisms develop and thus can be supported by international and national actors. The present study tackles the questions of how, and in what sequence accountability sub-types develop. We consider not only vertical (elections and political parties) and horizontal accountability (legislature, judiciary, and other oversight bodies) but also diagonal accountability (civil society and media) in both their de-jure and the de-facto dimensions. By utilizing novel sequencing methods, we study their sequential relationships in 173 countries from 1900 to the present with data from the new V-Dem dataset. Considering the long-term dimensions of institution building, this study indicates that most aspects of de-facto vertical accountability precede other forms of accountability. Effective institutions of horizontal accountability-such as vigorous parliaments and independent high courts-evolve rather late in the sequence and build on progress in many other areas.Keywords Accountability . Sequencing . Democratization . Government oversight . De-facto power Political accountability is both one of the cornerstones of good governance and a key topic in academia. This power of the people to hold political leaders to account is fundamental to representative democracy, hence a key feature of most definitions of democracy (e.g., Dahl 1971Dahl , 1989Schmitter and Karl 1991). It is also a top priority on St Comp Int Dev (2019) 54:40-70 https://doi.org/10.1007 Authors contributed equally and are listed in reverse alphabetical order. * Valeriya MechkovaValeriya.mechkova@gu.se 1 V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden the international development agenda, e.g., as a target of the Sustainable Development Goals (UN Resolution: A/Res/70/1). Yet, we know little about how and in what sequence different aspects of accountability evolve. The extant literature provides some suggestions on the sequence of democratization-thus how accountability starts to evolve. Dahl (1971) famously argued that it is conducive if competition among elites evolves before the expansion of participation, and there is some empirical support for this (Wilson 2015, p. 234). And while there are contributions on how one aspect of accountability may strengthen other aspects (e.g., Keane 2009), this study is the first of its kind by investigating if there are generalizable sequences in the evolution of accountability across 35 highly specific institutions with data covering 176 countries and 113 years.Taking Dahl's (1971) famous axiom as a point of departure, we argue that governments are more likely to allow for de-facto accountability if the costs of supplying accountability decrease and the costs of suppressing the demand for accountability increase. Distinguishing between i...

show abstract

More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers

Cited by 99 publications

References 6 publications

The cost of exposing cheating

The cost of exposing cheating

Putin, Popular Protests, and Political Trajectories in Russia: A Comparative Perspective

The Accountability Sequence: from De-Jure to De-Facto Constraints on Governments

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About