More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Ruffle, Bradley J.

doi:10.1006/game.1997.0630

Cited by 245 publications

(152 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Further, as in the case of Hoffman et al (1994), rejections are rare. Parrett (2006) studies behavior in dictator games following closely the design of Ruffle (1998) and obtains similar results. Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002) report that proposers in a dictator game who invest in effort that determines the surplus are extremely unlikely to share it with recipients.…”

Section: Previous Experimental Studies With Real-effort Investmentsmentioning

confidence: 68%

“…Most importantly, the high-performing receivers obtain offers in the ultimatum game that are not higher than they are in the dictator game. This shows that rewarding offers in Ruffle (1998) are motivated by fairness considerations and not by strategic considerations. Further, as in the case of Hoffman et al (1994), rejections are rare.…”

Section: Previous Experimental Studies With Real-effort Investmentsmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…Examples of such studies are Ruffle (1998), Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002), Parrett (2006) and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008). Ruffle (1998) studies behavior in dictator as well as ultimatum games. 'Receivers' compete with each other in a real-effort task that determines the surplus the 'allocators' will be asked to split.…”

Section: Previous Experimental Studies With Real-effort Investmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For their 11 The effect of effort in this treatment resembles most closely that in Ruffle (1998) and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008). The target number of words was chosen in anticipation that in most cases at least 3 sellers would encrypt the required amount of words.…”

Section: The Values Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Can real-effort investments inhibit the convergence of experimental markets?

Cason¹,

Gangadharan

Nikiforakis

2011

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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Evidence shows that real-effort investments can affect bilateral bargaining outcomes. This paper investigates whether similar investments can inhibit equilibrium convergence of experimental markets. In one treatment, sellers' relative effort affects the allocation of production costs, but a random productivity shock ensures that the allocation is not necessarily equitable. In another treatment, sellers' effort increases the buyers' valuation of a good. We find that effort investments have a short-lived impact on trading behavior when sellers' effort benefits buyers, but no effect when effort determines cost allocation. Efficiency rates are high and do not differ across treatments.

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Section: Previous Experimental Studies With Real-effort Investmentsmentioning

confidence: 68%

Section: Previous Experimental Studies With Real-effort Investmentsmentioning

confidence: 86%

Section: Previous Experimental Studies With Real-effort Investmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Values Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Can real-effort investments inhibit the convergence of experimental markets?

Cason¹,

Gangadharan

Nikiforakis

2011

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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show abstract

“…Ruffle (1998) studies DG in which the size of the dictator's endowment is determined by the receiver. Receivers are engaged in an ability task (general knowledge and skill-testing questions) and receivers' performance determines the dictators' endowments.…”

Section: Deservingnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Pay-What-You-Want game: What can be learned from the experimental evidence on Dictator and Trust Games?

Greiff

Egbert

2017

Management &Amp; Marketing

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Asset Legitimacy and Distributive Justice in the Dictator Game: An Experimental Analysis

Mittone

Ploner

2012

Behavioral Decision Making

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Distributive justice seems to guide behavior in reward allocation tasks in which subjects in a group jointly produce an endowment that is then allocated by a member of the group. It has been shown that allocators aim to preserve the proportionality between inputs (e.g., effort) and outputs (e.g., monetary rewards) of those in the group, even when this comes at a cost to themselves. We experimentally investigated whether justice considerations of this kind play a role in a double-blind dictator game when the assets to be allocated are generated exclusively through the effort of the decision maker. The experiment shows that distributive justice is an important source of motivation in highly demanding social environments in which reputational concerns and reciprocity are absent. This finding has been corroborated by an independent validity check and may have important implications for previous experimental findings and for the economics of charity.

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More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games

Cited by 245 publications

References 8 publications

Can real-effort investments inhibit the convergence of experimental markets?

Can real-effort investments inhibit the convergence of experimental markets?

The Pay-What-You-Want game: What can be learned from the experimental evidence on Dictator and Trust Games?

Asset Legitimacy and Distributive Justice in the Dictator Game: An Experimental Analysis

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