Moral Obligation, Self-Interest and the Transitivity Problem

Abstract

Is the relation 'is a morally permissible alternative to' transitive? The answer seems to be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally permissible alternative to A? However, as both Dale Dorsey and Frances Kamm point out, there are cases where this transitivity appears problematic. My aim in this paper is to provide a solution to this problem. I will then investigate two ways in which we might justify rejecting the transitivity of the 'is a permissible alternative to' relation.Next, I will look at Dorsey's solution, which involves a reinterpretation of the intuitions used to generate the problem. I will argue that none of these solutions are fully satisfying before going on to provide a novel solution to the problem and argue that it avoids the problems facing the extant solutions. IntroductionIs the relation 'is a morally permissible alternative to' transitive? The answer seems to be a straightforward yes. If Act B is a morally permissible alternative to Act A and Act C is a morally permissible alternative to B then how could C fail to be a morally My aim in this paper is to provide a solution to this problem. I will start in §1 by giving a precise outline of the problem. I will then, in §2, set out three desiderata that a satisfactory solution to the problem should satisfy. In the next two sections I will investigate three potential solutions to the problem that fail to satisfy these three desiderata. First in §3, I will explore two ways in which we might justify rejecting the transitivity of the 'is a permissible alternative to' relation. I will then, in §4 investigate Dorsey's solution, which involves a reinterpretation of the intuitions used to generate the problem in §1. I will then, in §5, lay out a novel solution to the problem which defends a limited form of transitivity by outlining a new theory of moral reasons that holds that there are three different moral roles that reasons can play: a moral 3 Kamm (1985 p.136) makes a similar point.3 justifying role, a moral requiring role and moral favouring role. I will finish in §6 by considering and responding to an objection that could be raised against my solution. The ProblemIn this section I will explain what The Transitivity Problem is. To start I will present three examples:Case One: Suppose that Charlie, a student nurse, is leaving his house one morning to attend a final year exam. As he leaves his house he notices an injured woman, Jane, lying on the pavement. After a quick assessment, it is clear to Charlie that, though her condition is far from critical, Jane needs to go to hospital. Moreover, the more quickly she gets to hospital the less complicated her recovery will be. He is then faced with a choice. He could drive Jane to the hospital himself, this would get her there more quickly but it would also mean missing his exam, as it is being held on the other side of town from the hospital. Missing the exam will mean ha...

Supererogation and conditional obligation

“…The justifying reason to keep one's kidney, if it can outweigh the requiring reason to donate, will also strongly favor selfishness(Hurka & Shubert 2012, p. 9). Another objection to our view is that some reasons are purely commendatory-they favor without justifying or requiring(Horgan & Timmons 2010;Archer 2016;Little & Macamara 2017). But this seems to invite odd recombinations.…”

“…8 and 30).17 Kamm's case is famous because it seems to involve a nontransitivity: you may do nothing rather than save the life (in a pairwise choice), you may save the life rather than keep your promise, but you may not do nothing rather than keep your promise. For discussion, seeArcher (2016),Portmore (2003Portmore ( , pp. 314-6, 2017, andMuñoz (2021c).18 Even if it were obligatory to keep the promise in Kamm's case, OKAY OR NEXT BEST would still wrongly imply that you must save the life if you won't keep the promise.…”

Three paradoxes of supererogation

“…The leading answer is that the supererogatory act is only better in a respect. Supererogation is favored by one kind of reason, but is opposed by weighty reasons of another kind, which are said to be “justifying” rather than requiring (Archer, 2016; cf. Gert, 2007; Lazar, 2019), “partial” rather than impartial (Parfit, 2011), or “non‐moral” rather than moral (Portmore, 2011; Slote, 1991)—whatever they are, they counterbalance the reasons to supererogate, stopping them from grounding an obligation 4.…”

Supererogation

“…There have been numerous attempts to provide a formal definition of supererogation, to the point where Heyd () suggests that the concept is one “that cannot be captured by a strict formal definition.” Despite Heyd's pessimism, the recent literature on the topic seems to be approaching a consensus on at least two issues concerning how to define supererogation. The first is that supererogatory acts are morally optional , meaning that both their performance and their omission are morally permissible (e.g., Archer, , p. 334; Ferry, ; Horgan & Timmons, , p. 37; Portmore, , p. 91; McElwee, , p. 506).…”

“…An additional problem that I do not have the space to investigate here is raised by Dorsey (, ) who argues that this view generates implausible results when we compare the interaction of moral and non‐moral reasons in a triad of cases. See Archer () and Portmore () for two ways of responding to this problem.…”