Supererogation and conditional obligation

Muñoz, Daniel Domínguez; Pummer, Theron

doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01724-y

Cited by 19 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 48 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As an alternative, the conditional-permission principle may be used to make sense of the rescue case, the twin case and the drug case: Q is permissible conditional on not doing P, if and only if Q is unconditionally permissible, or Q is the best option compatible with not doing P 10. The conditional-permission principle shows that aborting both fetuses is permissible, since it is, at least for some authors, unconditionally permissible to do so, and it also implies that aborting only one fetus is permissible because it is the next best option conditional on not carrying both fetuses to term.…”

Section: An Implausible Bridge Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Fetal reduction, moral permissibility and the all or nothing problem

Wang

2023

J Med Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is an ongoing debate about whether multifetal pregnancy reduction from twins to singletons (2-to-1 MFPR) is morally permissible. By applying the all or nothing problem to the cases of reducing twin pregnancies to singletons, Räsänen argues that an implausible conclusion seems to follow from two plausible claims: (1) it ispermissibleto have an abortion and (2) it iswrongto abort only one fetus in a twin pregnancy. The implausible conclusion is that women considering 2-to-1 MFPR for social reasonsought toabort both fetuses rather than just one. To avoid the conclusion, Räsänen suggests that it is best to carry both fetuses to term and give one for adoption. In this article, I argue that Räsänen’s argument fails for two reasons: the inference from (1) and (2) to the conclusion rests on a bridge principle that does not work in certain circumstances, and there is good reason to reject the claim that it is wrong to abort only one fetus.

show abstract

Section: An Implausible Bridge Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Fetal reduction, moral permissibility and the all or nothing problem

Wang

2023

J Med Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…13.For a number of puzzles related to the notion of supererogation – as well as a new account which purports to address them – see Muñoz and Pummer (2022). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two challenges for ‘no-norms’ theism

Reilly

2022

Rel. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A number of theistic philosophers have recently denied that God is subject to moral and rational norms. At the same time, many theists employ epistemological and inductive arguments for the existence of God. I will argue that ‘no-norms’ theists cannot make use of such arguments: if God is not subject to norms – particularly rational norms – then we can say nothing substantive about what kind of worlds God would be likely to create, and as such, we cannot predict the likelihood of any particular evidence given theism. What is more, I argue that this lack of constraint on God's creative act raises a serious sceptical challenge for no-norms theism.

show abstract

“… See Chisholm 1963 for a classic discussion of conditional duties and seeComesaña 2015 andMuñoz andPummer 2021 for more recent ones.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Contrastive consent and secondary permissibility

Pummer

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Consider three cases:Turn: A trolley is about to kill five innocent strangers. You can turn the trolley onto me, saving the five and killing me.Hurl: A trolley is about to kill five innocent strangers. You can hurl me at the trolley, saving the five and paralyzing me.TurnHurl: A trolley is about to kill five innocent strangers. You can turn the trolley onto me, saving the five and killing me. You can instead hurl me at the trolley, saving the five and paralyzing me.Most find the following four claims intuitively plausible:(1) It is permissible to turn the trolley onto me in Turn.(2) It is impermissible to hurl me at the trolley in Hurl.(3) It is impermissible to turn the trolley onto me in TurnHurl.(4) It is permissible to hurl me at the trolley in Turn-Hurl.

show abstract

Supererogation and conditional obligation

Cited by 19 publications

References 48 publications

Fetal reduction, moral permissibility and the all or nothing problem

Fetal reduction, moral permissibility and the all or nothing problem

Two challenges for ‘no-norms’ theism

Contrastive consent and secondary permissibility

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About