2002
DOI: 10.1093/eurrag/29.2.271
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Moral hazard, vertical integration, and public monitoring in credence goods

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Cited by 57 publications
(35 citation statements)
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“…Because obtaining and processing information is a costly process in itself, consumers may assess quality on the basis of these generic firm types as "quasi-labels." Vis-à-vis locally producing firms (e.g., utilities run by the municipality or consumer-owned businesses like cooperatives), it might be easier to obtain information regarding the electricity generation process (Bonus, 1986;Vetter & Karantininis, 2002). Specifically, they might believe that because information from municipality-owned utilities and cooperatives is accessible at low cost, these firms may be more trustworthy and less likely to engage in dishonest behavior when reporting quality (cf.…”
Section: Theoretical Framework and Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because obtaining and processing information is a costly process in itself, consumers may assess quality on the basis of these generic firm types as "quasi-labels." Vis-à-vis locally producing firms (e.g., utilities run by the municipality or consumer-owned businesses like cooperatives), it might be easier to obtain information regarding the electricity generation process (Bonus, 1986;Vetter & Karantininis, 2002). Specifically, they might believe that because information from municipality-owned utilities and cooperatives is accessible at low cost, these firms may be more trustworthy and less likely to engage in dishonest behavior when reporting quality (cf.…”
Section: Theoretical Framework and Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Part of this same problem is adverse selection where a firm feigns compliance to gain reputation and market share without the costs involved with actual compliance (King and Lenox 2000). The moral hazard problem is present in markets where the quality (in this case, the invasive quality) of a product is not well understood or cannot be verified by consumers (Akerlof 1970, Cavaliere 2000, Vetter and Karantininis 2002. This can especially be a problem for higher priced, high demand cultivars where profit rewards will be the motivation for firms to cheat.…”
Section: Legislated and Voluntary Regulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Vorst (2002) [2] investigated into the contamination of agri-food, and pointed out that governments should play an important role in the trace of agri-food supply chains. Vetter(2002) [3]. contended that vertical integration was an effective method to handle moral hazard in the market where consumers cannot verify the safety and characteristics of products.…”
Section: From the Perspective Of Supply Chainmentioning
confidence: 99%